



**PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING AS  
A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING TEACHERS' EFFECTIVENESS:  
OPINION OF STAKEHOLDERS IN ABIA STATE, NIGERIA<sup>i</sup>**

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**Abstract:**

In an effort to explore possible ways of improving teacher professional practice in Nigerian schools, this study sought to determine the opinion of teachers and parents of students on a proposal to introduce performance contracting in the Nigerian school system. Performance contracting is synonymous with pay-for-performance, performance-based-pay, merit-pay, and differentiated pay. The study was guided by 3 research questions and 2 hypotheses. 300 teachers and 300 parents purposively selected from literate ones, constituted the subjects for the study. The instrument for data collection was a 10 -item questionnaire constructed by the researcher and validated by competent and teachers' lectures. The questionnaire requested respondents to indicate their preference for any of the 10 suggested compensation options they would want to be introduced into the Nigeria schools system. The reliability of the instrument was 0.95 using the Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient. In addition to the questionnaire 2, free-response questions were posed to the respondents to determine their news on the pay-for-performance proposal and the reasons for views. Data were collected from the teachers and parents, and analyzed using means and standard deviations for the research questions and Z-test for the hypotheses. Results showed that all the teachers disagreed with the proposal to introduce all the 10 options while all parents wanted all the ten to be introduced. The results further showed that the more and less experienced teachers did not differ in their negative opinion about the proposal. Respondents expressed their opinions freely. Recommendations were made accordingly.

**Keywords:** performance contracting, teacher effectiveness, opinion of stakeholders

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## 1. Introduction

For both the developed and developing countries, education remains a potent instrument for guaranteeing social, economic and political advancement. In Nigeria which is a developing country, there is no doubt that all the efforts by the Federal and State Governments towards educational improvement hinge on the capacity of teachers at all levels to deliver quality education to the Nigerian children who are the nation's hope for a better tomorrow.

In recent years, it has become a cliché to talk about “falling or fallen standard of education” even though to some, it is a controversial issue. While some insist that the standard of education has fallen, others argue that the reverse is in fact the case.

Whatever the position or opinion held by any person, we cannot deny the fact that incessant strike actions by teachers at the primary and secondary school levels in many states are a dominant feature in our educational system. This is because in many states of the federation teachers are owed salary payments for as much as six months. Under such a situation, one can guess that no serious academic work goes on in the schools, especially in the public schools. The morale of teachers is abysmally low, the teachers hardly go to school in time, and when they do, not much academic work takes place. The head teachers have no moral courage to query any teacher who is either late or absent from his/her duty post.

Since external examinations must take place as and when due, and since not much teaching job is done by the teachers, the only way for students to pass the examinations is by fraudulent means. This explains why examination malpractices appear to be the rule rather than the exception in many public schools in Nigeria. This has remained a recurring decimal in our schools and apathy seems to have engulfed the teachers. The enthusiastic ones quickly relapse into docility when their enthusiasm is not supported by government through payment of their salaries.

Many teachers, on account of irregular payment of their salaries now combine petty trading/business with teaching, with the business angle taking up sixty to seventy percent of their time for teaching. With this divided attention, it is difficult if not impossible to expect any substantial professional output from teachers. The more the situation of unpaid or delayed salary payment persists, the worse the quality of the teachers' duties and the lower the academic standard.

Abia state government and people are always desirous of having good quality education for their people. Parents and guardians, however financially handicapped they may be, are prepared to spend their last kobo in funding the education of their children and wards. This explains why people are agitated over the inadequacies in the school system and question about possible strategies for improving the quality of our schools. One of the strategies being suggested by stakeholders is the adoption of performance contracting or pay-for-performance (Mkpa 2017)

Stucket and Hall (2008) explain that many school districts now have performance contract with private learning system firms or groups of teachers. These contracts call

for the education of designated groups of students whose measured achievement determines the amount of the contract payments.

This arrangement calls for a clear definition of the expected quality of student performance on the basis of which payment is made. In clearer terms, performance contracting advocates for differentiated pay for teachers based on their performances. Some call it pay-for-performance, performance-based pay, professional compensation, merit pay and differentiated pay. In America, policy makers and politicians have endorsed or championed differentiated pay approaches (eg American Federation of Teachers 2008, Obama, 2008) and states and districts have spent huge sums of money to fund the compensation plans. All the plans supplement the traditional salary scale with bonuses for teachers. They use a variety of criteria in determining how to allocate the award to teachers largely on the basis of the criteria for effective teaching, again, largely as evidenced by students' test scores and formal evaluation. The programmes differentiate pay for teachers on the basis of their success in the classroom, rather than their knowledge and skills, the roles they have in the school, or the teaching assignment they take.

There are three main valuations in the orientations of the compensation plans for the "pay for performance" initiative. These are implied in the following issues: (1) what measures – standardized tests, professional evaluation, or several indicators – to use in assessing teachers' performances; (2) whether to identify top performers with relative ranking or standards-based comparisons; and (3) whether to provide awards at the individual or group level. Each of these issues has challenges and produces a distinct set of incentives for teachers that differ in their focus, strength and effects.

Historically, American school districts had as far back as the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries, experimented with granting salary increases using administrators' assessments of individual teachers' merit or effectiveness (Young, 1993). Due to lots of abuses that characterized the plans, the single salary scale quickly replaced it.

With the Sputnik, another short-lived effort was made in the 1960s when there was a widespread criticism of the American education.

In the 1980s, another wave of unsustained interest was witnessed following the publication of *The Nation at Risk* in 1983 and soon the "merit pay" movement died down (Hanushet 1986).

These failed efforts have been documented by Kelly (2002), and Podgursky and Springer (2007). The failure, to a large extent, resulted from corrupt practices, uncertainty by teachers about what was actually being expected of them as a basis for assessing them, unclear criteria for assessment, favouritism in assessment etc.

Although veteran teachers remember the failed attempts at merit pay and tend to respond with skepticism, newer teachers often express greater degree of support for differentiated salaries on the basis of performance (Jacob and Springer 2008). From various indications, "*reward for excellence in teaching*" appears to be gaining in popularity over the years. Strizete et al (2006) report that in 2003-04, about 8% of public schools reported using pay incentives to reward teaching excellence. Podgursky and Springer (2007) state that 25% of school have joined the movement since 1999-2000.

The plan of pay incentives is becoming increasingly widespread among many states in the USA where plans for implementing differentiated pay structure have been developed. Nearly all the proposals build on the single increments that supplement a standardized base salary.

The approaches to reforms of the single salary exist in four main categories namely according to Odden and Keley (2002).

- 1) Knowledge and skills: pay for undertaking professional development acquiring skills based credentials.
- 2) Roles: pay for assuming special roles and responsibilities.
- 3) Market factors: pay for teaching in hard-to-staff subjects or schools.
- 4) Performance: pay for effective instructional practice and student achievement.

Each of these efforts is designed to improve the quality and performance of teachers by using financial incentives that reward more than loyalty and educational attainment but encourage teachers to undertake new learning relevant to instructional practice, to take on different roles or assignments, and to implement more effective practices or exert greater efforts in their classrooms. By altering the incentive structure in teacher compensation, districts strive to change teacher behaviour and improve student performance.

There are, expectedly, pros and cons of the Pay-For-Performance (PFP) plans. Proponents of the PFP suggest that *"offering a 20% performance bonus to the top performing 10% of teachers, would induce roughly an 11% increase in the number of top-third students becoming teachers"* (Hartney 2018) In other words, the adoption of PFP appears to play its own role in enabling school districts to recruit early – career teachers with higher levels of academic aptitude. Hartney also observes that the handful of academic research in this subject tends to suggest that more academically accomplished teachers and even prospective teachers express attitudinal preferences for PFP over the current fixed pay system. He adds that recent college graduates and early career teachers in the US with high cognitive abilities are more likely to support PFP than their less academically accomplished peers. Eden (2017) states four ways. Performance Contracting can turn outdated infrastructure in schools to an A+ These include; (i) reduced capital expenditure, (ii) improved occupant comfort (iii) replacement of aging building systems, and (iv) achievement of a safer and cheaper school.

Corcoran, Evans and Schwab (2004) believe that PFP will encourage teachers to commit their best to the teaching task and go the extra mile to support student learning. Furthermore, it will improve the quality of the overall teaching work force by attracting the best motivated into the profession.

The opponents of the PFP plan (Neal 2007, and McClymont, 2018) have advanced ten reasons why PFP is ineffective. According to them:

- 1) It implies that teachers are not motivated to teach and need to be bribed by higher pay to do their jobs better.
- 2) It creates competition among teachers rather than collaboration.
- 3) It pressures teachers to discriminate among their colleagues.

- 4) The pay model wants to run schools like businesses where teachers are paid on commission.
- 5) It pressures teachers to teach to the test rather than provide students with a more holistic education.
- 6) It rewards aggressive teachers
- 7) It punishes teachers for factors they are not responsible for and cannot control.
- 8) Student standardized test scores are not a good indicator of teacher effectiveness
- 9) It causes high teacher turnover school districts that utilize the merit pay model lose droves of teachers which costs them huge sums of money every year.

## **2. The Problem**

As we can observe from the foregoing, there are merits and demerits of performance contracting or pay-for-performance plan as a strategy for improving student learning. As can also be observed, the strategy is gaining popularity especially in the United States where many states have adopted it. Given that it has worked, and is working elsewhere, that is, succeeding in achieving improved student performance in their examinations by making teachers more committed to their duties, what will the education stakeholders say if the practice is proposed to commence here in Nigeria? The idea is to encourage teachers to be more serious in their duties so that the students they teach can genuinely pass very well in their internal and external exams without being involved in exam malpractices.

### **2.1 Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of the study is to determine the opinion of teachers and parents of the students in Abia State on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in the Nigeria educational system. More specifically, it seeks to find out:

- 1) The opinion of basic education teachers on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in Abia State School System.
- 2) The opinion of parents of basic education students on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in the Abia State School System.
- 3) The opinion of more experienced (older) and less experienced (younger) basic education teachers on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in Abia State School System.
- 4) If there are differences in the opinions of parents and teachers on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in Abia State School System.
- 5) If there are differences in the opinions of more experienced (older) and less experienced (younger) teachers on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in Abia State School System.

### **2.2 Research Questions**

The following research questions guided the study:

- 1) What are the opinions of basic education teachers on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in our school system?
- 2) What are the opinions of parents of basic education students on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in our school system?
- 3) What are the opinions of the more experienced (older) and less experienced (younger) basic education teachers on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in our school system?

### 2.3 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were formulated to guide the study:

- a) There is no significant difference in the opinions of teachers and parents on the proposal to adopt pay-for-performance in our school system.
- b) There is no significant difference in the opinions of the more experienced (older) and the less experienced (younger) teachers on the proposal to adopt pay-for-performance in our school system.

### 3. Methodology

Abia is a state in Nigeria with a population of almost four, million people largely interested in the education of their children. The study adopts a descriptive/survey research design. From the population of about 3500 teachers a purposive sample of three hundred (300) teachers, representative of the three Education Zones of Abia State was drawn. From the Parent – Teachers – Associations of Schools in the three Education Zones of the state, 300 parents were also selected from among those who were able and willing to fill out the instrument – questionnaire constructed for the study.

The instrument for data collection was of 10 item questionnaire constructed by the researcher and validated by three specialists, one from Measurement and Evaluation Department and the other two from the Department of Curriculum and Teacher Education of Abia State University, Uturu. Additionally 3 basic Education teachers not included in the study validated the instrument.

The questionnaire had two sections, A and B. Section A was for personal data which sought information on the status of the respondent, whether a teacher or a parent and years of experience if a teacher.

Section B had on the left hand side, a listing of 10 possible compensation plans or pay-for-performance options while on the right hand side respondent were expected to indicate (tick) along a four-point scale of strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree, which option reflected their opinion on the proposal to introduce the particular pay-for-performance option.

The reliability of the instrument was determined through the administration of the questionnaires twice to a group of 28 teachers and 28 parents who did not participate in the study, over an interval of three weeks. Their scores on the two administrations were correlated using the Pearson's Product Moment correlation coefficient which yielded an index of 0.95.

In addition, some two oral questions were asked the teachers and parents in order to obtain more information, through their free responses on the reasons for their opinions. The questions went to fifteen teachers: and fifteen parents randomly and proportionately selected from across the three educational zones, namely:

1. What are your views on the P.FP proposal?
2. Give reasons for your responses.

Data were collected using post-graduate students as research assistant who distributed and collected back the 300 copies of the questionnaires each from the teachers and from the parents; i.e 100% return.

### 3.1 Method of Data Analysis

The data collected were collated and presented in tables for clear understanding. The data obtained from respondents were analyzed using the mean score and standard deviation to answer the research questions while the hypotheses were tested with the z-test at 0.05 level of significance.

## 4. Results

**Research Question One:** What are the opinions of basic education school teachers on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in our school system?

**Table 1:** Mean scores and standard deviation of teachers on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in the school system. Teachers (N= 300)

S/N	The opinions of teachers on the proposal to adopt pay-for-performance	Mean	St. D	Remark
1	Teachers whose students perform very well in the internal exams should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.47	1.19	Disagreed
2	Teachers whose students perform very well in the external exams should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.89	1.37	Disagreed
3	Teachers who teach the tough subjects should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.27	1.11	Disagreed
4	Teachers who take additional responsibilities should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.67	1.28	Disagreed
5	Teachers who cover the exam syllabus in good time should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.53	1.23	Disagreed
6	Teachers whose students perform very well in the weekly continuous assessments should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.57	1.24	Disagreed
7	Teachers whose students win laurels for the school should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.49	1.21	Disagreed
8	Teachers, whose students consistently demonstrate exemplary character, should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.75	1.31	Disagreed
9	Teachers, who are punctual, regular, student friendly and teach very well, should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.53	1.23	Disagreed
10	Teachers who receive high professional assessment rating by internal and external superiors should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.65	1.28	Disagreed
	<b>Aggregate Mean</b>	<b>1.58</b>	<b>1.25</b>	

Table 1, revealed that all the items in the table were disagreed by respondents on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in our school system, with mean scores below the criterion mean of 2.50. The table also showed an aggregate mean score of 1.58 with standard deviation of 1.25, which is an indication that the respondents disagreed on the items in the table.

**Research Question Two:** What are the opinions of parents of basic education students on the proposal to introduce pay-for performance in our school system?

**Table 2:** Mean scores and standard deviation of Parents on the proposal to introduce pay-for-performance in the school system. Parents (N= 300)

S/N	The opinions of parents on the proposal to adopt pay-for-performance	Mean	St. D	Remark
1	Teachers whose students perform very well in the internal exams should receive extra cash bonuses.	3.64	1.90	Agreed
2	Teachers whose students perform very well in the external exams should receive extra cash bonuses.	3.67	1.91	Agreed
3	Teachers who teach the tough subjects should receive extra cash bonuses.	3.47	1.85	Agreed
4	Teachers who take additional responsibilities should receive extra cash bonuses.	3.53	1.87	Agreed
5	Teachers who cover the exam syllabus in good time should receive extra cash bonuses.	3.37	1.83	Agreed
6	Teachers whose students perform very well in the weekly continuous assessments should receive extra cash bonuses.	3.60	1.89	Agreed
7	Teachers whose students win laurels for the school should receive extra cash bonuses.	3.18	1.78	Agreed
8	Teachers, whose students consistently demonstrate exemplary character, should receive extra cash bonuses.	3.38	1.83	Agreed
9	Teachers, who are punctual, regular, student friendly and teach very well, should receive extra cash bonuses.	3.60	1.89	Agreed
10	Teachers who receive high professional assessment rating by internal and external superiors should receive extra cash bonuses.	3.19	1.78	Agreed
	<b>Aggregate Mean</b>	<b>3.46</b>	<b>1.85</b>	

Table 2 shows the mean scores and standard deviation of parents on the proposal to introduce pay-for performance in our school system. The respondents agreed on all the items in the table with mean scores above the criterion mean of 2.50. Aggregate mean score of 3.46 with standard deviation of 1.85 implies that the respondents agreed on the items in the table.

**Research Question Three:** What are the opinions of the more experienced and less experienced (younger) teachers on the proposal to introduce pay-for performance in our school system?



**Table 3:** Mean scores and standard deviation of more experienced and less experienced teachers' opinion on the proposal to introduce pay-for performance in our school system

S/N	The opinions of more experienced and less experienced teachers on the proposal to adopt pay-for-performance	More Experience		Less Experience		Remark
		Mean	St. D	Mean	St. D	
1	Teachers whose students perform very well in the internal exams should receive extra cash bonuses	1.58	1.24	1.30	1.09	Disagreed
2	Teachers whose students perform very well in the external exams should receive extra cash bonuses.	2.01	1.41	1.55	1.21	Disagreed
3	Teachers who teach the tough subjects should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.41	1.16	2.17	1.45	Disagreed
4	Teachers who take additional responsibilities should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.76	1.30	1.46	1.17	Disagreed
5	Teachers who cover the exam syllabus in good time should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.67	1.26	1.37	1.26	Disagreed
6	Teachers whose students perform very well in the weekly continuous assessments should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.60	1.25	1.93	1.37	Disagreed
7	Teachers whose students win laurels for the school should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.55	1.23	2.14	1.44	Disagreed
8	Teachers, whose students consistently demonstrate exemplary character, should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.67	1.28	1.47	1.17	Disagreed
9	Teachers, who are punctual, regular, student friendly and teach very well, should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.59	1.24	2.14	1.44	Disagreed
10	Teachers who receive high professional assessment rating by internal and external superiors should receive extra cash bonuses.	1.63	1.26	1.39	1.14	Disagreed
<b>Aggregate Mean</b>		<b>1.65</b>	<b>1.26</b>	<b>1.69</b>	<b>1.27</b>	

The data on table 3 show that the weighted mean values of all the items ranged between 1.37 and 2.17 which are below the criterion mean of 2.50 and were disagreed by respondents on the proposal to introduce pay-for performance in our school system

**Hypothesis One:** There is no significant difference in the opinions of teachers and parents on the proposals to adopt pay-for performance in our school system.

**Table 4:** z-test analysis on the responses of teachers and parents on the proposals to adopt pay-for performance in our school system

Categories	N	Mean	SD	Df	z-cal.	z-crit.	Decision
Teachers	200	1.582	0.167				
Parents	300	3.463	0.178	598	-3.434	1.960	Significant

Table 4 revealed that teachers have mean and standard deviation scores of 1.582 and 0.167, while parents have mean and standard deviation scores of 3.463 and 0.178 respectively. With degree of freedom of 598, the calculated z-value of -3.434 is greater

than the critical z-value of 1.960, hence, the null hypothesis was rejected, which implies that there is a significant difference in the opinions of teachers and parents on the proposals to adopt pay-for performance in our school system.

**Hypothesis Two:** There is no significant difference in the opinions of the more experienced (older) and the less experienced (Younger) teachers on the proposal to adopt pay-for performance in our school system.

**Table 5:** z-test analysis of the responses of more experienced and less experienced teachers on the proposal to adopt pay-for performance in our school system

Categories	N	Mean	SD	Df	z-cal.	z-crit.	Decision
More Experienced	200	1.647	0.157	298	-0.082	1.960	Not significant
Less Experienced	100	1.692	0.359				

Table 5, revealed that at 298 degree of freedom and 0.05 alpha level, the z-calculated was found to be -0.082, while the z-critical was 1.960. Based on the fact that z-calculated is lower than the z-critical value, the null hypothesis which states that there is no significant difference between the opinions of the more experienced (older) and the less experienced (younger) teachers on the proposal to adopt pay-for performance in our school system is retained.

## 5. Discussions

The findings of the study show that whereas the teachers are not in favour of the proposal to introduce the pay-for-performance plan in our educational system, parents are in support of it. Expectedly, the parents would want to install any strategy that guarantees greater teacher effectiveness so that their children and wards could have the best quality education. The parents expect that if the pay-for-performance is introduced, many teachers would strive to earn more money by ensuring that their students pass well in internal and external examinations. They expect that it would attract better and more serious minded teachers and in fact encourage more teachers to seek to improve on their pedagogical skills (Hoxby and Leigh 2004)

### 5.1 Oral Responses of the Parents

Most of the parents responded as follows to the two questions posed to them:

- *“Payment-for-performance will make the teacher more serious than they are at the moment as you know, not much is going on in most public schools due to non-payment of the salaries of the teacher”.*
- *“PEP will likely differentiate the hardworking teachers from the lazy ones and so pay people according to their works. This is justice. This is equity”*

- *“PFP may make teachers in public schools to work as hard as their counterparts in private schools. That’s why result of private schools are always better than those of public schools that have even better quality teachers”*
- *“If PFP is introduced the more enthusiastic professionals will be attracted to the teaching job which today appears to be a dumping ground for all sorts of people”*
- *“PFP will make students more serious and focused since the teachers will not tolerate laxity on their (students’) part”*
- *“PFP will make the goals of education achievable because it is the quality and performance of teachers that drive the goals of education”*
- *“PFP will relieve parents of much of the jobs they are compelled to do because teachers fail to do their jobs in public schools”*

On the other hand, many, in deed most of the teachers were opposed to the idea of pay-for-performance. The teachers appeared to be aggressively antagonistic to the idea as they did not seem to want to be pressurized into a competitive frame of mind that would make them seek to work harder than they would wish to do. They unanimously decided to stick to the regular pay system in which teachers receive uniform salaries based on their qualifications and years of teaching experience. For them, this would ensure greater unity and solidarity among them and so make their collective bargaining ability stronger and more effective. These were the distillations from their oral responses when interrogated.

## 5.2 Oral Responses of the Teachers

Most of the teachers’ oral; responses to the questions were:

- *“We must stick to the original payment pattern which was the basis for our employment”*
- *“This is Nigeria, if you introduce PFP, those who are friendly with, or related to the powers that be will receive the higher pays whether they deserve them or not”*
- *“How will you know the teacher who contributed more to a student’s brilliant performance? – is it the one who taught him/her in class or the one who counseled him/her on how to study hard? Which of them should receive the pay-reward?”*
- *“Every teacher applied to teach what he/she was willing to teach the idea of tough or easy subject should not arise since we don’t force or “impose subjects on teachers ”*
- *“It will introduce unhealthy competition and rivalry among teachers and threaten their unity of action during any emergency”*
- *“It is likely to institutionalize examination malpractice in the ‘teachers’ effort to excel in their internal and external examination.*
- *“We plan to produce well –rounded children both in character and in learning. The PFP appears to play down on other learning or behavior outcomes in favour of academic achievement”. These comments are in agreement with the views expresses by McClymont 2008 and Neal 2007. Who opposed the idea of pay-for-performance.*

The findings indicate that more and less experienced teachers do not differ in their opinions on the PFP plan. This may be because both suffer a similar fate of non-payment or delayed payment of their salaries and so are demoralized as professionals.

They may, therefore, as a result wish to remain in solidarity with their older colleagues so that any collective action will produce the desired effect. Perhaps if they – the teachers-were working under a conducive salary-payment condition, they (newer teachers) would probably have thought and responded differently. If the newer teachers were more brilliant and better motivated, they would probably have responded differently (Hartney, 2018)

Our nation is in a hurry to develop like other nations of the world and the quality of teachers is critical to the bid for national development. (FRN. 2013)Every effort needs to be made to attract and retain the best quality teachers. It would appear that PFP is a viable strategy for attracting and retaining the best quality teachers which we do not seem to have today. We therefore recommend that we give the PFP a trail in our state and nation at large and see the extent to which it can attract to the teaching profession the nature/quality of teachers we envision for our educational systems.

This proposal has substantial financial implication for states and the federal government. Going by the experiences of other parts of the world that have tried out the PFP, a lot of additional funds will be required to implement it. We therefore call on the federal and state governments to make the needed funds available for its implementation.

It is painful to observe that the regular routine salary structure is very hard for states to pay as a result of which they often approach the federal government for “bail-out-funds”. It therefore becomes doubtful if the governments can /accept that they can afford it.

If however, the various governments consider the education improvement a top priority in their scales of preference they can do it. Where there is the will, there will be a way.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

On the basis of the foregoing, we recommend as follows:

1. This study needs to be conducted in other states of the federation where the teachers' salaries are up –to-date in terms of punctuality and regularity of payment;
2. That, without prejudice to the teachers' understandable opinion, we should go ahead to try out the PFP possibly, first on a small scale, for example, taking one education zone of selected states as pilot states for the experiment.
3. Following from above, states and the federal government should consciously make budgetary provision for the implementation of the PFP plan.
4. In implementing the plan, efforts should be made to eliminate all abuses that may jeopardize the proper implementation of the plan. To this end, the implementers need to study available literature to identify all possible abuses and obstacles and take steps to avoid them.

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