



**INVESTIGATING INSTITUTIONAL COMPLICITY  
IN ACADEMIC FRAUD: A STUDY OF MOBILE PHONE  
CHEATING FACILITATION BY INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS  
AND POLICE IN SOMALIA'S NATIONAL SECONDARY  
EXAMINATIONS: A MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS**

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**Abstract:**

The systematic deterioration of academic integrity in Somalia's National Secondary Examinations is examined in this paper, with a particular emphasis on the crucial role institutional actors play in enabling mobile phone cheating. Exam setters, distributors, administrators, parents, and security staff are all involved in a complicated web of corruption, despite the traditional discourse's emphasis on student-led cheating. The study shows that institutional complicity accounts for 88% of the variance in examination misconduct using a quantitative multiple regression analysis. The results show that exam personnel are the main perpetrators of fraud ( $r = .773$ ), combined with the direct cooperation of police officers and a strategic partnership between parents and principals. A regression model  $R^2 = 0.880$  confirms that these institutional factors collectively account for 88% of cheating facilitation. In order to eradicate the "pay-to-pass" atmosphere, the study concludes that a comprehensive movement toward restructuring of administration, resources and personnel, examination policies, and legal accountability is necessary for a sustained restoration of educational sovereignty.

**Keywords:** examination malpractice, institutional corruption, mobile phone cheating, academic integrity, digital surveillance

**1. Introduction**

Exam misconduct has become a global problem, and governments from the US to Nigeria and India are using drastic tactics like internet shutdowns and AI surveillance to stop cheating. The basic idea that scores should reflect effort and merit is undermined by this

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"digital arms race" between exam integrity and developing cheating tools, particularly as mobile phones make dishonest practices more accessible (The Guardian, 2022).

Exam malpractice, which devalues credentials through unethical acts including cheating, impersonation, and bribery, has become a global threat to educational integrity (Adesina, 2021). This dilemma, which is especially prevalent in secondary schools in Tanzania, Kenya and Pakistan, is exacerbated by the extreme pressure of high-stakes exams (Mkwachu & Mwila, 2024). A study by Suleman *et al.* (2016) indicates that malpractice is frequently a systematic problem that is made possible by a dishonest culture among teachers, parents and administrators. Also, in exchange for financial incentives from school owners, complicit invigilators regularly alter results, seriously undermining the academic system's impartiality.

Exam misconduct in Somalia has escalated to a concerning degree due to the penetration of cell phones into national exam halls, which reveals both human and technology flaws. Evidence demonstrates that those tasked with upholding academic integrity, such as invigilators, supervisors, and even police officers, are occasionally implicated in facilitating infractions, which makes the situation more concerning and complicated than in other contexts (Mohamed, 2022).

After more than 20 years, Somalia resumed unified national secondary exams in 2015, which was a significant development for the nation's educational system. 3,522 students took part in this initial session, yielding a 97.19% pass percentage. The second phase of reconstructing national education began in 2016 when participation increased dramatically to 11,573 pupils, a 238% rise (Sharif *et al.*, 2025).

The system grew significantly between 2017 and 2018. More than 23,000 applicants took tests in 2017 under tight security, substituting official credentials for private certificates. In order to prevent forgeries, digital security measures were added to certificates by 2018, when participation had reached roughly 30,000. Regional differences started to show, with Banadir reporting higher failure rates despite a robust national pass rate of 87% (Mohamed, 2022). 2019 and 2020 saw a shift in emphasis toward gender advancement and standards. Compared to 2015, participation increased by 85%, but pass rates dropped to 75% as a result of tighter oversight and less misconduct. In courses like physics, Arabic, and English, female participation has increased since 2017, and by 2020, girls were on pace with boys (Sharif *et al.*, 2025).

Between 2021 and 2023, Somalia's test cycle remained resilient in the face of COVID-19's global disturbances. Every year, more than 34,000 students took part, and pass rates stabilized at about 87%. In certain areas, girls started to perform better than boys, with a pass percentage of 93.04% as opposed to 85.31% for boys. Transparency and institutional improvements were prioritized in the 2023 cycle, which reinforced centralized examinations as the only reliable route to gain admission to universities (Sharif *et al.*, 2025)

Somalia's national examination system attained maturity and modernization by 2024 and 2025. With a strong pass percentage of 93.8%, participation peaked at more than

38,000 students. With an average of 91.99%, Aisha Adan Ugas Hirsi led the country in academic achievement. The successful restoration of Somalia's educational sovereignty was symbolized by the introduction of high-security certificates with dry stamps and logos, as well as curriculum revisions like business studies (Sharif *et al.*, 2025)

Exam malpractice persists, undermining public trust in the Somali educational system despite the ministry's efforts to stop it through policy. Intense competition in the labor market and structural problems, including underqualified employees, large class size, irrelevant curricula, and lax oversight, are the main causes of this problem. Although academics support the use of biometric technologies (Mireku *et al.*, 2023) and stringent regulations (Adeniran *et al.*, 2023) to prevent cheating, Somalia's implementation of these strategies is still hampered by financial issues.

However, exam misconduct has remained a continuous challenge from the 2015 relaunch until 2025. Exam setters, publishers, distributors, supervisors, invigilators, and even police officials initially presented serious structural vulnerabilities. By hiring new national trainers and teachers, the Ministry of Education eventually addressed many of these issues and decreased malpractice in a number of sectors. Other actors, including parents, principals, police, and guards, continued to cause issues by using cell phones to facilitate cheating. Exam misconduct is still a major problem in Somalia's educational system despite continuous efforts to stop it (Ali, 2025).

### **1.1. Objectives**

To investigate the influence of institutional actors, including exam setters, publishers, distributors, markers, principals, parents, supervisors, invigilators and police officers on the facilitators of mobile phone cheating in Somalia's national secondary examination.

### **1.2 Research Hypothesis**

**H1:** There is a significantly relationship between the actions of institutional (setters, publishers, distributors, marketers, supervisors, invigilators, police officers) and the prevalence of examination fraud.

**H2:** The collaborative efforts of parents and school principals significantly predict the level of mobile phone cheating facilitation.

## **2. Literature Review**

Important insights into the causes of exam misconduct can be gained from the theories of Jean Piaget and Albert Bandura. According to Bandura's Social Learning Theory, children mimic dishonest behavior when they witness peers or authority figures engaging in it. This tendency was observed at Secondary schools. In addition, Piaget's Cognitive Development Theory highlights that people frequently create internal defenses for such immoral actions. To break this cycle, a comprehensive strategy addressing the interrelated roles of administrative, teachers, students and supervisors is needed. By

encouraging moral role models and putting in place stringent anti-malpractice regulations with obvious enforcement, interventions must thwart the copycat process. These effective tactics ultimately shift cognitive perspectives against dishonest through explicit penalties (Balfanz & Byrnes, 2012).

### **2.1 The Nexus of Institutional Malpractice: Exam Setters and Publishers in Somalia's Secondary Examinations**

School exams are regarded as vital for measuring students' achievement in terms of their comprehensive and application of the course materials (Balfanz & Byrnes, 2012). But during the examination process, using a mobile phone as primary cheating methods seems inevitable without proper control (Diego, 2017).

In Somalia, academic dishonesty is more of an institutional problem than a student one. Corrupt officials, setters, and printers who leak content for financial gain undermine the integrity of the national examination at the source. This widespread cooperation undermines the nation's educational standards and kills meritocracy by fostering a pay-to-play environment (Ahmed, 2022; Ali, 2025).

In Somalia, industrial publishing and exam delivery logistics pose serious security hazards. Vulnerability sometimes arises in printing houses when bulk unauthorized copying occurs or during transit, when distributors intercept sealed goods. A single physical breach can propagate across social media in a matter of minutes due to the shift to digital sharing, rendering the exam's legitimacy as a whole invalid. In the end, national examinations are compromised long before students walk into the exam room if there are no contemporary security measures in place during the printing and dissemination stages (Mohamed, 2022).

The Ministry of Education, Culture, and Higher Education (MoECHE) has implemented stringent security measures and professionalized its personnel in order to overcome these weaknesses. Hiring qualified teachers and knowledgeable trainers to effectively oversee the examination procedure has been an important step. The Ministry renovated printing facilities with CCTV and required audits, and created sterile preparation zones where devices are prohibited in order to prevent leakage (DG, 2025). These institutional adjustments have greatly decreased the risk of unauthorized disclosure and restored the integrity of national examinations by strengthening the chain of custody and implementing strict oversight.

### **2.2 Examination Malpractice: The Role of Examination Distributors and Markers in Undermining the National Secondary Exam in Somalia**

Exam delivery logistics are a high-risk phase where the supplies are most susceptible to leakage and theft. In the Past, Distributors took advantage of weaknesses by utilizing unsafe warehouses or opening letters while they were in transit to post pictures on WhatsApp groups (Jam, 2025). The Ministry of Education changed its procedures to address this, employing security escorts and vetted staff for every examination crate.

The marking procedures are an important last step that is frequently susceptible to bribery and unfair scoring, which can damage the accomplishments of diligent students (Ministry of Education, Culture, and Higher Education [MoECHE], 2022). The Ministry of Education has put in place a blind marking system that uses encrypted codes to conceal student names in order to stop markers from inflating scores or overlooking wrongdoing. These improvements guarantee a fair, transparent, and merit-based certification process by segmenting the grading assignment and using checking teams to confirm outcomes (MoECHE, 2022).

The Ministry has established an external monitoring structure incorporating civil society, academics, parents and some students in order to increase public trust and guarantee equity. By auditing marking centers to ensure that scoring criteria are applied impartially, this diverse organization promotes social accountability (Mahad, 2025).

### **2.3 Socio-Environmental Drivers of Malpractice: The Strategic Alliance of Principals and Parents in Somalia's National Examinations**

Some principals in the cutthroat private school sector utilize the results of national exams as a marketing tool to increase enrollment, which leads in system dishonesty. Administrators may obtain illicit funds from students to bribe security personnel and invigilators in order to create a false impression of brilliance. Additionally, some schools employ subject-matter experts to complete examinations in real time and provide students with the answers through structured channels (British Council, 2025).

Some parents provide the financial support to keep the corruption going, while principals supply the infrastructure, such as encouraging teachers to leak answers through encrypted applications. This partnership teaches students that success is purchased rather than earned by substituting financial leverage for merit. In the end, this results in graduates who have official credentials but lack the real skills required for a professional job or national development, creating a shortage of human capital in the country (Moha, 2021; Somali Education Research Institute, 2025).

### **2.4 Institutional Complicity: The Role of Supervisors in Facilitating Mobile Phone Cheating**

Exam supervisors who purposefully assist students in using cell phones to cheat are considered to be engaging in deliberate facilitation in Somalia as opposed to simple ignorance. Motivated by self-interest, these officials go beyond inadequate oversight to openly engage in unethical behavior that jeopardizes important national exams. Exams administrators are essentially betrayed by this deliberate manipulation of the testing environment, which guarantees students undue benefits (Sakwa & Abdulah, 2025). Cheating on Somalia's national exams is a recurring problem, especially in difficult subjects like science and math. A lack of students' preparation, parental pressure, and inadequate monitoring all contribute to this issue. Mobile phone use and other misconduct are encouraged when teachers and administrators actively support students

or fail to enforce tough discipline (Zakaria, 2025). In the end, the legitimacy of national diplomas and the worth of the entire educational system are compromised by these gaps in attention.

Supervisors have been a major source of vulnerability since the start of Somalia's national exams in 2015 because of widespread conflicts of interest. Since many supervisors came from the same networks of private schools that they were supposed to oversee, impartiality was sometimes exchanged for allegiance or money. Widespread malpractice resulted from this, including the sale of exam papers and willful carelessness in the classroom. This seriously compromised the integrity of the MoECH's assessment procedure (Sidow, 2025).

On May 13, 2019, Minister Abdullahi Godah Barre took the historic decision to cancel the national secondary school exams, demonstrating the seriousness of test fraud in Somalia. Shortly after the testing session began, it was discovered that question papers were being sold and leaked on social media, leading to this decision. The Minister promised to hold corrupt officials accountable for tampering with exam packages, ordered a temporary social media lockdown to stop further digital spread of leaked content, and scheduled new exams for later that month in an effort to restore integrity (Goodax, 2019).

Supervisors are in charge of ensuring the integrity of exams, yet there is evidence that some of them deliberately encourage cheating by engaging in direct misbehavior. According to instructor reports, some supervisors take bribes to open test packets ahead of time, take pictures of the information, and give it to particular students or administrators. Furthermore, by permitting cell phones in exam rooms, these officials promote dishonesty, an issue that is especially common in rural communities with lax oversight and accountability (Zakaria, 2025).

In general, cheating is more common in regional exams than in those held in the capital. The reason for this discrepancy is that the capital city's stringent regulations and controls are frequently significantly more stringent than those in rural areas. Many students from the capital choose to transfer to outlying states like Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle in order to take their exams in a more relaxed setting because they are afraid that they would fail under such strict monitoring (Jailani, 2025).

The invigilators who keep an eye on the halls are usually chosen from the local schools in the area, while the main exam supervisors are sent from the capital. This leads to a conflict of interest, which frequently causes the usage of cell phones for cheating to rise dramatically. When a supervisor travels from the capital, they frequently encounter a concerted effort from parents, district officials, and school administrations who may offer or promise financial bribes to ignore misconduct. The supervisor is frequently unable to intervene or put an end to the widespread cheating because of the intricate network that develops between security personnel, pupils, parents, and local officials (Jailani, 2025).

Students in the Luuq District engaged in widespread cheating to the point where they produced identical answers and scores, which is a blatant example of this problem. The integrity of the procedure was jeopardized because the findings were identical, which resulted in the tests being completely canceled. Consequently, the students were forced to retake the examinations at a later date. And Supervisor misconduct has been formally acknowledged by the Ministry of Education, which has highlighted particular court investigations in the Luq District concerning officials who permitted cheating (Sharaw, 2025).

This institutional corruption is exemplified by a prominent instance involving a chemistry teacher who was forced to solve the exam for students after being added to a school-run WhatsApp group where pirated papers were disseminated. The administration just assigned another teacher to do the assignment after he ethically declined. This episode highlights the fact that supervisors are frequently the main cause of leaks and actively promote the malpractice that they are supposed to stop (Mohamed, 2022).

To reduce fraud and enhance accountability, the Ministry of Education implemented significant reforms beginning in 2019. These efforts resulted in a new system by 2023 in which supervisors are chosen only from government workers and national instructors who have undergone screening. Exam packets are now secured with unique locks and tamper-proof envelopes that are only opened an hour prior to the test in order to prevent escapes. The public's confidence in the integrity of Somalia's national examination system has been restored thanks to these stringent procedures and increased scrutiny (DG, 2025).

## **2.5 The Role of Invigilators in Facilitating Mobile Phone Malpractice**

Exam administrators who purposefully assist students in using mobile phones to obtain unfair advantages are guilty of mobile phone cheating facilitation. Rather than being an accident, this is frequently a purposeful act motivated by self-interest in Somalia. These officials undermine the validity of the entire system and the credibility of national findings by leaking answers during live sessions via platforms like WhatsApp (Himal Press, 2025).

Even while invigilators are crucial to preserving the integrity of exams, some have been caught deliberately helping students cheat. Six invigilators in the Luuq District were suspended by the Ministry of Education for misconduct, which was verified by the Banadir Court (Court, 2025). Many administrators purposefully overlook cell phone use and neglect to report infractions; they frequently defend their carelessness by citing concerns about their own safety and possible reprisals from nearby pupils.

On June 19, 2025, the last day of national exams, a student aggressively attacked an invigilator, underscoring the seriousness of these safety problems. After the invigilator had seized the student's phone and reported the cheating two days prior, the attack was a form of retaliation. In order to maintain accountability and protect the integrity of the

national examination process, the Ministry of Education referred the case to court due to the involvement of students who were also members of the security forces (Court, 2025). Since 2015, Somalia's national exams have encountered numerous difficulties. At first, invigilators were selected from networks of private schools, which led to conflicts of interest when their employers pressured them to trade exam papers for cash. Widespread disclosures on social media were made possible by this setting, which seriously undermined public confidence and unfairly punished truthful pupils (Somali Education Research Institute, 2024).

2019 saw the start of reform initiatives with tighter oversight to stop documents from spreading online, but fundamental problems remained. Teachers were recruited into WhatsApp groups to answer stolen questions, demonstrating that staff personnel continued to be the main source of leaks. Many invigilators continued to disregard their responsibilities, either by justifying their involvement as "helping" students in order to evade severe scrutiny or by pointing to the Ministry's inability to shield them from student clashes (Mohamed, 2025).

The Ministry of Education addressed these systemic shortcomings by implementing major reforms by 2023. To avoid conflicts of interest, all invigilators are now appointed solely from freshly hired national instructors, severely eliminating employees from private schools. The reliability and fairness of Somalia's national exams have significantly changed as a result of these strict regulations, which have significantly decreased mobile phone cheating (Abel, 2021).

## **2.6 The Role of Police Officers in Facilitating Mobile Phone Malpractice**

Police officials who facilitate mobile phone cheating are guilty of a documented crime involving rogue security workers who violate their obligation to ensure the integrity of exams. Rather than protecting materials, these officers work with teachers or students to use mobile devices to leak exam content. This malpractice is a significant breach of public trust and is legally considered a serious crime. Officers have been detained for these actions in recent incidents, such as Kenya's 2025 KCSE, underscoring the systemic threat that corruption poses to important regional exams (Kenyan Education News, 2025).

However, evidence points to certain officials engaging in misconduct by taking modest payments to neglect these responsibilities. Officers have allegedly negotiated with students to carry devices into exam rooms, conceal phones in designated locations, or even toss them over walls and through classroom windows, according to witnesses. Due to these security lapses, students obtained phones that had allegedly been seized at official checkpoints (Ali, 2025).

Security personnel's role in enabling cheating exposes systemic weaknesses and a lack of accountability. According to reports, some police officers work with parents, instructors, and school administrators to take money in exchange for letting cell phones inside exam rooms. The goal of schools to have a competitive edge in the education

market by falsely exaggerating their success rates is often the driving force for this corruption (British Council, 2025).

Facilitating cheating has far-reaching effects that seriously harm the country's educational system. Exam integrity is mostly threatened by police involvement, which is similar to the corruption of invigilators. Many students have given up on academic preparation in favor of strategizing how to cheat because they now rely on these illegal routes. Without appropriate disciplinary measures and structural reforms to address petty financial interests, the facilitation of mobile phone cheating continues to undermine the credibility of national certificates and the fairness of the academic process (Nyandwi, 2017).

### **2.7 Role of the Ministry of Education**

In order to guarantee that national secondary exams closely follow the approved national curriculum, the Ministry of Education is essential. The ministry confirms that all test questions accurately reflect the content that students have studied over the academic year before the testing season starts. To guarantee a balanced degree of difficulty, the ministry arranges specialized seminars for educators and subject-matter specialists (Dualeh, 2023). By ensuring educational equity through strict curriculum implementation and control, pupils are shielded from questions that fall outside of their purview.

The ministry's primary duty is to carefully choose and train competent personnel to oversee the entire examination lifecycle. The ministry makes sure that everyone participating is prepared to uphold the integrity of the exam by educating supervisors and invigilators on standard operating procedures. In order to reduce local prejudice and guarantee an equitable setting for all applicants, the ministry frequently rotates invigilators across different centers (DG, 2025).

The ministry imposes stringent security and accountability procedures on all employees participating in the exam to protect it. Maintaining the privacy of documents while they are being printed and stored is of utmost importance. According to ARA (2024), data encryption and contemporary "digitization" are currently employed to stop unwanted access to exam materials. Before each student receives a unique identification card, this step verifies that they have successfully completed the necessary educational levels. Mohamed (2022) asserts that this procedure is necessary to stop impersonation, in which an unauthorized individual tries to take the test in a student's place. The ministry maintains the legitimacy of the national certification process through this verification and the thoughtful placement of testing locations.

## **3. Material and Methods**

The article used a quantitative approach to investigating institutional complicity in the national secondary secondary examinations.

### 3.1 Sample and Sampling Techniques

The data evaluated in the study were collected from approximately 302 institutional actors, including teachers, principals, parents, and students.

### 3.2 Instrument

A Likert-scale questionnaire was employed for data collection to measure the participants' responses.

### 3.3 Reliability

The instrument showed a Cronbach's alpha of .736, indicating high internal consistency and reliability.

**Table 1:** Reliability Statistics for Institutional Complicity

Variable	Items	Cronbach's alpha
Institutional Complicity Factors	8	0.736

The Cronbach's alpha value of 0.736 indicates acceptable internal consistency.

## 4. Results

The primary objective of this study was to investigate how institutional players such as exam setters, publishers, distributors, markers, supervisors, invigilators, principals, parents, and police officers affect mobile phone cheating during Somalia's National Secondary Examinations.

### 4.1 Hypothesis

Reading the elements that encourage mobile phone cheating in Somalia's national school exams.

**Hypothesis 1 (H1):** This hypothesis investigated whether the facilitation of mobile phone cheating is predicted by the behavior of institutional players such as exam setters, publishers, distributors, markers, supervisors, invigilators, principals, parents, and police officers.

The significant level was set at 0.000 based on the ANOVA results. The null hypothesis is thus disproved. This suggests that the facilitation of cheating in national tests is strongly positively correlated with institutional actors, which are a significant predictor.

**Hypothesis 2 (H2):** This hypothesis examined the predictive ability of parents-school principals collaboration on the facilitation of cheating. H2 is likewise rejected in its null form at a significance level of 0.000. The findings verify that the degree of mobile phone cheating facilitation on national exams is positively correlated and significantly by parental and principal engagement.

**Table 2: Correlation Analysis**

Variable	Instructional actors	Parents and principals	National exams
Instructional Actors	1.000	-	.773*
School and Parent Alliance	.164	1.000	.647*
Sig. (1-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.000

**Note:** The association between the independent factors and the facilitation cheating of national secondary exams is shown in this table.

The findings show that institutional acts and cheating facilitation have a substantial, significant, and positive association ( $r = .773$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). This implies that mobile phone cheating becomes more easier as institutional cooperation rises.

**Table 3: Compined Model**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of Estimate
1	.773	.597	.596	.33766
2	.938	.880	.879	.18498
3	1.000	1.000	1.000	.00000

**Note:** The model summary shows the extent to which the predictors account for the variance in the dependent variable.

The R-Square values, which range from .597 to 1.000, show that the selected predictive variable parents, school administrators, and institutional actors contribute significantly to the model and account for the great majority of the variance in the exam cheating facilitation.

**Table 4: ANOVA**

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	f	Sig.
1	49.004	1	49.004	429.796	.000
2	72.180	2	36.090	1054.704	.000
3	82.069	3	27.356	—	.000

**Note:** The regression model's overall statistical significance is validated by the ANOVA table.

The highly significant and non-random association between the predictors and the dependent variable is confirmed by the high F-values (429.796 and 1054.704) combined with a p-value of 0.000.

**Table 5: Institutional Predictors of Exam Malpractice.**

Variable	n	%	r	$\beta$	t	p
<b>Gender</b>						
Male	276	91.4%	—	—	—	—
Female	26	8.6%	—	—	—	—
<b>Institutional Predictors</b>						
(Constant)	—	—	—	1.487	15.270	.000
Exam Personnel Complicity ( $X_1$ )	—	—	.773**	.527	20.732	.000
Security and Police ( $X_2$ )	—	—	.622**	.362	26.025	.000
School and Parent Alliance ( $X_3$ )	—	—	.647**	.440	91.341	.000
<b>Model Summary</b>						
R <sup>2</sup>	.880					
F=Statistic	1054.7					

**Note:** The table summarises the demographic distribution, correlation coefficients, and regression weights for the predictors of mobile phone cheating facilitation.

## 4.2 Population Analysis

According to this data, there is a notable gender disparity among the staff who manage examinations. Just 8.6% (n=26) of the 302 responders were female, compared to 91.4% (n=276) who were male. This implies that men dominate the administrative and security environment of the national exams.

## 4.3 Correlation Analysis

The facilitation of mobile phone cheating and institutional actors has a considerable, positive, and statistically significant link, according to the Pearson Correlation.

Exam Personnel Complicity (r=.773) was shown to be the strongest driver, suggesting that individuals in charge of cheating, disseminating, and overseeing exams have a major role in the malpractice. There were also significant positive associations between School and Parent Alliance (r=.647).

Security/Police Complicity (r=.622). These results demonstrate that the combined acts of educational custodians and security officers directly jeopardize the examination's integrity.

Exam integrity is directly threatened by the combined acts of educational custodians and security officials, as all p-values were 0.000, indicating that these associations are very significant.

## 4.4 Multiple Regression Analysis

To ascertain the predictive ability of these institutional actors on cheating facilitation, a multiple regression analysis was performed. Exam staff, law enforcement, and the school-parent alliance account for 88% of the variance in mobile phone cheating facilitation, according to the model's R<sup>2</sup> of 0.880. The model demonstrates a high statistically significant fit according to the ANOVA results (F = 1054.7, P<.001). The regression formula is expressed as:

$$Y = 1.487 + 0.527 X_1 + 0.362 X_2 + 0.440 X_3.$$

This shows that a unit increase in Exam Personnel Complicity ( $X_1$ ) enhances the facilitation of mobile phone cheating by 0.527 when all other parameters are held constant. Malpractice increases by 0.362 and 0.440 units for Police/Security Complicity ( $X_2$ ) and School/Parent Alliance ( $X_3$ ), respectively.

## 5. Conclusion and Discussion

### 5.1 Conclusion

The study comes to the conclusion that academic fraud in Somalia is not an isolated student issue but rather a widespread institutional problem. Deep-seated risks persist even if major changes between 2015 and 2025 successfully professionalized the jobs of exam setters, publishers, and invigilators by hiring from the national trainers and teachers pool to reduce private-sector conflict of interest. In particular, because Ministry junior employee may put their own financial interest ahead of academic integrity, their indirect inclusion as regional supervisors sometimes results in supervision failures.

The report also reveals a serious security flaw in which security personnel and police officers regularly allow cell phones inside exam campuses in exchange for bribes, so compromising high-security procedures. A purposeful partnership between parents and school principals, who supply the infrastructure and funding required to maintain a "pay-to-pass" climate, exacerbates this system failing.

In the end, mobile phone cheating continues to be a system treat to the legitimacy of Somalia's national assessments and its wider educational sovereignty due to this cooperative corruption between security officials and educational custodians. The value of national certifications and the quality of education will continue to fall in the absence of more stringent legal accountability and the elimination of these illegal networks. The Findings demonstrate that academic fraud in Somalia's secondary exams is not only act by students but an organized issue. The large  $R^2$  value and strong coefficients offer empirical proof that an institutional players and security personnel who are complicit actively support mobile phone cheating.

### 5.2 Discussions

Strong regression coefficients and a high  $R^2$  value (0.880) give empirical evidence that mobile phone cheating is actively maintained by a network of complicit individuals rather than by individual student effort. These findings are highly consistent with studies on academic integrity in unstable or post-conflict states conducted by Akinyi (2022) and Suleiman (2023). These academics content that in these setting, institutional corruption usually takes place of meritocracy, making gatekeepers and exam staff the main enablers of exam misconduct and leakage. The established pattern of deception in the Somali context is confirmed by the findings.

These results, on the other hand, go counter to Western-centric literature, such as Smith and Brown (2021), which suggests that technology cheating is a bottom-up problem predominantly caused by student effort. This study disproves that viewpoint in the Somali setting by showing that the gatekeepers tasked with maintaining exam integrity have the greatest impact on encouraging misconduct. According to study, the international reputation of Somali national credentials will continue to decline in the absence of stringent legal responsibility and the dissolution of these illegal networks.

## 6. Suggested Recommendations

- 1) Ministry of Education, Culture, and Higher Education should review and update national curriculum include syllabi, and textbooks to make that they are appropriate for Somali students.
- 2) Before the national secondary at the beginning of each academic year, conduct ongoing supervision and train teachers and school administrators to empower.
- 3) Exam format should be appropriate for students and what they have been taught. First, the continuous assessment test given to students in schools should be based on the national exam format.
- 4) To preserve uniformity and fairness, the Ministry should establish explicit, legally enforceable national examination regulations and make sure they are uniformly enforced in all regions
- 5) The ministry should enforce severe disciplinary actions against police personnel, supervisors, invigilators and principals who engage in cheating and hold schools responsible for inadequate preparedness.
- 6) Install network-blocking devices at exam centers, use mobile phone detection techniques during exam, distribute exam papers security using digital codes, and bolster gate checks. To avoid collaboration with local pupils, make sure police and examination invigilators alternate across districts.
- 7) The ministry should install CCTV cameras and signal jammers in testing facilities to stop illegal cell phone use and ensure exam integrity. Building a professional, disciplined environment for national exams also requires adequate financing for staff training in ethics and malpractice prevention.
- 8) To fortify exam integrity, the ministry should fund professional ethics training for staff, promote merit-based success through community awareness, and establish an independent authority, to provide transparent oversight and auditing of the national examination process.

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### **Conflict of Interest Statement**

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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