CODE-SWITCHING & LANGUAGE ATTITUDE AMONG THE DRUZE COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL: THE CASE OF DALIYAT EL-KARIL VS. MAJDAL SH'AMS

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Abstract:
This study focuses on language practices and language attitudes among the Druze community in Israel. It examines the practice of codeswitching (CS) and its correlations with language attitudes among two historically, socially, and politically different communities - Daliyat El-Karmil (DK) in the Carmel mountains and Majdal Sha’ms (M.Sh) in the Golan Heights. This study explores the effect of religious orientation on the communities’ use of CS and attitudes toward language. A total number of one hundred and eight males from both communities, ranging in age from 18 to 35, were part of this study. The data were collected using two different research instruments: The participants were asked to watch a short-animated video and tell its story. Later, they were asked to complete a questionnaire examining their linguistic practice and attitudes towards Hebrew and Arabic. The findings of this study indicated that the community in D.K. practices CS more than the community in M.Sh, and that the secular groups codeswitch more than the religious groups in both communities. The results also showed that the secular participants from D.K. have assimilated into Israeli society. This can be attributed to their frequent language contact in Israeli colleges and universities, service in the Israeli military forces or Israeli workplaces. That's why this group has a clear advantage over the other three groups regarding their competence in Hebrew.

Keywords: sociolinguistics, linguistic diversity and attitude, linguistic code-switching, family language policy

1. Introduction

This study focuses on language practices and language attitudes among members of the Druze community in Israel. It examines the practice of codeswitching (CS) and its correlations with language attitudes among two historically, socially, and politically different communities -
Daliyat El-Karmil (DK) in the Carmel mountains and Majdal Sha’ms (M.Sh) in the Golan Heights. This study explores the linguistic differences between the two communities regarding their CS patterns and language attitudes, as well as their religious orientation, which affects their use of CS and attitudes toward language. In short, this research studies the differences in language practice, CS, and language attitudes among each community’s religious and secular groups. This paper proposes that there is a correlation between CS and language attitude and that the religious orientations found among members of the Druze community have an effect on both. This study focuses on the communities that the Druze inhabit. Therefore, the study only presumes to represent the Druze community in Israel (DK) and the Golan Heights (M.Sh).

The Druze community in Israel, which was part of the Arab Palestinian community during the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate, chose a route that separated itself from the Arab minority in Israel. This route made the Druze community socially, politically and economically closer to the Jewish majority. This change has had numerous consequences on the community’s life, including their linguistic preferences. Thus, this paper examines whether the Druze community in Israel, including the Golan Heights, with its numerous historical, social, and political differences, exhibits a consistent linguistic pattern and equal practice of CS and displays parallel attitudes toward Arabic and Hebrew.

2. Theoretical Review

In this section, I present a short overview of the linguistic structure in Israel, which provides an introduction to the bilingual background of the Arab minority and the Druze in Israel. This section is followed by a very brief overview of CS and the way scholars perceive the correlation between language and identity. Finally, when studying these two distinct communities, it is important to also present a socio-political background of the communities in order to understand their differences.

2.1 The Linguistic Structure in Israel

The historical periods in Palestine have brought tremendous changes in all areas, including languages. During the Ottoman Empire, the official/governmental language was Turkish. This changed during the British Mandate when English was recognized as the official language of the government. This change strengthened the status of Hebrew, which became an official language in addition to Arabic (Amara & Mar’i, 2002). However, though the status of the three official languages was seemingly defined, the establishment of Israel led to drastic changes in the sociolinguistic structure of the state. Spolsky and Shohamy (1999) noted the dominance of Hebrew as the sole language for communication, government, business, and economic matters compared to Arabic, which plays a major role only within Arabic-speaking localities.

Hebrew played a major role in establishing a national home for the Jewish community. This language helped create the new national identity of the different groups of Jews in Israel. As mentioned earlier, due to the dominant use of the language in areas that are vital for citizens, for example, the Israeli parliament, courts, media and institutions of higher education (Yitzhaki, 2010), Israel succeeded in compelling all of its citizens to know Hebrew (Spolsky & Shohamy,
Moreover, the Arab minority in Israel found itself compelled to use Hebrew for pragmatic reasons: for work, health services, higher education, government offices and others (Amara & Mar‘i, 2002).

Hebrew penetrated the Arab community, turning the community into Arabic Hebrew bilinguals, who accept that Hebrew is necessary for ‘success in life’ and ‘economic success’ (Shohamy & Donitsa-Schmidt, 1998). The educational system made Hebrew the first foreign language to be taught in Arab schools, while Jewish students study Arabic as an elective or as a second foreign language after English (Benavot & Resh, 2003). It is also important to note that the policy concerning teaching Hebrew in Arab schools extends to emphasizing the Jewish language, culture, religion and history (Amara & Mar‘i, 2002). As a result, as is the case in all bilingual communities where two or more languages are present, the practice of CS becomes obvious, as it can ease communication.

2.2 Codeswitching (CS)
Linguists have defined codeswitching in different ways. Some assert that in bilingual contexts, people tend to move from one language to another in the same sentence. This kind of alteration is called code-switching (Benson, 2001; Bhatti, 2018). Another explanation offered by Muysken (2000) states that CS occurs when two languages’ lexicon and grammatical features overlap in the same utterance. Nedashkivska (2018), on the other hand, defines the practice of CS as a central strategy the speaker adopts. It “contributes to participants’ signals of belonging, identity claims, and negotiations” (Nedashkivska, 2018, p. 120). Thus, in bilingual or multilingual contexts, the use of the first language, or the use of different languages within the same utterances (CS), can reflect the speaker’s identity. The following section briefly overviews the correlation between language and identity.

2.3 Language and Identity
Many studies have shown the correlation between language and individual identity; they perceive language as a core component of one’s identity rather than as a convenient means of communication between interlocutors (Fishman, 1991). Through language, people can show who they are and determine how others define them. Therefore, language plays a significant role in “the socialization of the individual and the collective” (Amara & Mari, 2002, p.2).

However, in bilingual or multilingual communities, this function cannot be satisfied since the demand for the language of the majority group and maintaining it as the official language can overwhelm the ‘co-territorial languages’. In such situations, language becomes a symbol of power and domination. The language of the majority or the powerful group deters minorities from speaking their languages and becomes the national or the official language of the State (Tusi, 2006). This is the case in Israel: Hebrew had a significant symbolic meaning for the Jews and had a remarkable function in the process of nation-building (Suleiman, 2003).

Thus, because Hebrew is the dominant language in all spheres of Israel, this affects the language practices and language attitudes of the minority groups, including the Druze. We can ask: Does this affect how the Druze communities perceive their first language? However, before answering this question, I will present a brief socio-political background of both communities.
2.4 The Druze Community in the State of Israel

The Druze population constitutes a unique community in Israel. The population is 138,000, constituting nearly 1.6% of the Israeli population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Therefore, it is the third largest minority group (nearly 8.0%) of the Palestinian minorities in Israel (Isleem, 2016). The Druze community resides only in the northern area of the country. There (in their communities), they have adopted a unique settlement pattern and constitute the majority, while Muslims and Christians are the minorities (Raufman, 2011).

When the State of Israel was established in May 1948, Israel aimed at isolating the Druze group from the larger Palestinian Arab community. It accomplished this by adopting the ‘Druze particularism’ idea, which turned it into a distinct ethnic and religious group (Firro, 2001). As a result, the Druze are labelled ‘non-Arab Arabs’, who share the same language and culture as the Palestinian Arab minority - predominantly the Muslim minority. However, the Druze preserve a distinct identity.

In the early 1950s, the Israeli government passed laws that aimed to separate the Druze community from the Arab community. Among these was the law that imposed mandatory conscription into the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). This law was later extended to include Druze youth in May 1956 and played a significant role in shaping the national identity of the Druze community. It drastically changed the economic conditions of the Druze, especially the young men who joined the IDF (Firro, 2001). In 1962, the word. ‘Arab’ was eliminated from the Druze birth certificates and identity cards and was replaced by the word ‘Druze’ as the national ethnicity of the community (Halabi, 2014).

2.5 The Druze in the Golan Heights

A second interesting group of Druze in Israel is the Druze of the Golan Heights. This area is located on the steep hills of Hermon Mountain and was ruled by the Syrian government up until 1967. During the Six Day War in 1967, Israel defeated its neighboring countries and, since that time, has ruled some of their territories – among them the Golan Heights, which had belonged to Syria. This area was mainly inhabited by Syrian Druze, who first settled there during the 18th century. Today, the Druze in the Golan Heights constitute approximately 5.3% of the Druze community in Israel (the population size is 26,300) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). In 1981, the Israeli government announced that Israeli citizenship would be given to the Golan Druze, who objected and non-violently resisted the decision. The members of the Golan Heights community who accepted the citizenship were completely rejected by the community (Kennedy, 1984).

After the occupation of the Golan Heights, the Druze continued to resist the Israeli confiscation of their Syrian identification papers. In 1982, the Israeli government proclaimed ‘a state of siege’; however, soon after, it decided to enter into negotiations with the Druze concerning the community’s demands that the Israeli government would not interfere with their civil rights and water and land rights. Most importantly, the Druze community demanded that their young adults would not face conscription into the Israeli military. The Israeli government promised the Druze community that their identity cards would have the word ‘Arab’ written next to the nationality classification rather than the word ‘Druze’. The Druze insisted on having...
their nationality listed as Arab since they perceived themselves as belonging to the Arab nation rather than as a distinct community.

Today, members of this community have permanent Israeli resident status instead of Israeli citizenship. In addition to the Israeli Laissez-Passer document, which is issued for international travel, the Druze can attend higher education institutions in Israel and Syria (Mort, 2012). The Druze who accepted Israeli citizenship can vote in elections, run for the Knesset and get an Israeli passport.

Due to the Civil War in Syria, millions of Syrians have escaped their homeland in search of shelter in other countries around the world. As a result, Israel has witnessed an increase in the number of members of the Golan Druze community, especially the youths who have applied for Israeli citizenship. These sociopolitical backgrounds of the two Druze communities lead us to ask if this kind of assimilation changes the linguistic structure of the Druze communities.

3. Materials and Methods

3.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses

3.1.1 Research questions

This research focuses on the frequency of CS practice among the Druze in the DK and M.Sh. regions and studies the effect of language attitudes on this frequency. It further examines the differences between these two communities and the differences between religious and secular groups.

The research questions are grouped into two aspects:

A. Code-switching practice
   1) Are there differences in the CS pattern between the two communities?
   2) Are there differences in the CS pattern between the religious and the secular in the same community or cross-community?

B. Language practices and attitudes
   1) Are there differences in language competence, practices, and attitudes between the two communities? Are there differences among religious and secular groups within the same community or between the communities?
   2) Is there a correlation between the communities’ CS patterns and language attitudes?
   3) Is there a correlation between religious orientation and language attitude?

3.1.2 Hypotheses

A. Code-switching practice
   1) Place of residence and religious orientation will affect CS practice. Members of the D.K community will exhibit more CS than members of the M.Sh. community. The secular group will exhibit more CS than the religious group in both communities.

B. Language practices and attitudes
   1) Place of residence and religious orientation will affect language practices and attitudes. Hebrew will be used more in D.K. than in M.Sh. Religious orientation will also affect language practice: the secular group will report more practice of Hebrew
than the religious group. Both the religious and secular groups in D.K. will exhibit more practice of Hebrew than the groups in the M.Sh. community.

2) The groups in D.K will exhibit a more positive attitude toward Hebrew than the groups in M.Sh. The effect of religious orientation will be significant in D.K: the secular group will report a more positive attitude toward Hebrew than the religious group. Both the religious and the secular groups in D.K will exhibit more positive attitudes toward Hebrew than the groups in M.Sh.

3) There is a correlation between the communities’ CS patterns and language attitudes, and there is a correlation between religious orientation and language attitudes.

3.2 Participants
One hundred and eight men, aged 18-35, were randomly selected for this research. They all live in Druze communities where Arabic is the first language, and Hebrew is the second language of its inhabitants. Fifty participants came from D.K and 58 from M.Sh. An equal number of religious and secular participants were chosen from each community. However, in M.Sh., 33 participants were religious, and 25 participants were secular.

3.3 Instruments
The data were collected using two different research instruments: the participants were asked to tell a story after watching a short video clip and to fill out a questionnaire. The participants were asked to watch a short-animated video on YouTube called "Cool Daddy"*1, which lasted for 50 seconds with no spoken words. They were then asked to describe what they had watched. Later, they were asked to complete a questionnaire examining their linguistic practice and attitudes towards Hebrew and Arabic.

The questionnaire included three parts:
1) personal information (place of residence, age, religious orientation, military service, etc.).
2) Language practice (the language used mainly by the participant, the language primarily used in the community, etc.). The participant could choose either Hebrew or Arabic.
3) Language attitudes: This section included 27 statements that examined the participants' attitudes toward Arabic and Hebrew.

The items were rated on a scale of 1 to 5 – 5 indicated strong agreement, and 1 indicated strong disagreement with the statement. The participants were asked to choose the number that best described their attitude.

3.4 Procedure and Data Analysis
The participants received a brief description of the study’s rationale, hoping they would agree to participate. However, many potential participants refused, even after being introduced to the research goals and guaranteed anonymity. The data were collected at the participants’ chosen locations, such as a quiet school classroom, the workplace or home. The data collection procedure included two sections:

1) Telling a story

The participant watched the short clip and was asked to describe it. All descriptions were
recorded on an Olympus VN-1100 PC Digital Voice Recorder, and later transcribed for analysis. I gave the participants the instructions in Arabic. Some participants asked what language to use. In Arabic, I replied, 'Any language you want.' In order to examine the CS practice of each participant, both the number of utterances and the number of CS words were counted. Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to measure the means of CS practice among each group.

2) Completion of the questionnaire

After telling the story, each participant was asked to complete a questionnaire that examined his attitudes toward the two official languages in Israel. The questionnaire was translated into Arabic and Hebrew, and each participant chose a language. To analyze the data, a Chi-Square Test was used for language practice, and t-tests were used to examine language attitudes and the effect of religious orientation on the responses.

4. Results

The statistical analysis presented in this section begins with statistics that display the independent variables: place of residence, religious orientation, and conscription in the military (Table 1). The following sections are grouped according to the study’s hypotheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Secular</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Secular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Orientation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Conscription</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1 The first hypothesis of CS

According to Figure 1, the community in D.K reported more use of CS (M = 22.55, SD = 28.66) than the community in M.Sh (M = 0.64, SD = 2.46), (F (1, 104) = 47.724, p = 0.000). Significant differences were also found between each community’s religious and secular participants. The secular residents of D.K (M = 38.58, SD = 32.86) showed more CS than the religious participants (M = 6.52, SD = 7.85). The religious participants from D.K. exhibited more CS than their counterparts in M.Sh (M = 0.39, SD = 1.12). The secular participants in M.Sh (M= 0.97, SD = 3.54) showed more use of CS than the religious participants there (F(1, 104) = 26.5, p = 0.000). These results showed a significant effect of place of residence and religious orientation on CS.
4.2 The Second Hypothesis: Language Practices and Attitudes

Three measures—language competence, language practice, and language attitudes—were examined to explain the above differences in CS patterns.

4.2.1 Language Competence

I examined the groups’ language competence in both languages in order to determine whether there were significant differences between the groups’ language competence. This phenomenon could affect the dependent variables outlined above. According to Table 2, both the religious (M = 4.20, SD = 0.707) and the secular participants (M = 4.56, SD = 0.583) in DK reported high competence in Arabic (t(48) = -1.964, p = 0.055). Nevertheless, the secular participants in DK showed higher competence in Hebrew (M = 4.64, SD = 0.490) in comparison to the religious participants (M = 3.80, SD = 0.957), (t(48) = -3.905, p = 0.000). In M.Sh, on the other hand, the religious participants (M = 4.56, SD = 0.698) and the secular participants (M = 4.74, SD = 0.445) reported higher competence in Arabic (t(56) = -1.228, p = 0.224) as compared to Hebrew (Religious M 3.59, SD 0.797), Secular (M = 3.97, SD 0.875), (t(56) = -1.697, p = 0.095).

Interestingly, both religious groups reported similar language competence in the two languages (Arabic: t(50) = 1.824, p = 0.74, Hebrew: t(50) = -0.851, p = 0.399). However, significant differences in Hebrew competence were found among the secular groups: the secular participants in DK reported higher competence in Hebrew (t(54) = -3.429, p = 0.001). However, no significant differences were found in their Arabic competence (t(54) = 1.325, p = 0.191).

Table 2: Means and SD of Hebrew and Arabic Competence of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Daliyat El-Karmil (N = 50; 46.3%)</th>
<th>Majdal Sha’ams (N = 58; 53.7%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic competence</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>.707</td>
<td>4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew competence</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>.957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4.2.2 Language Practice

The participants were asked to state the language they consider as their mother tongue and the language they use most frequently in their personal lives and in the community. All participants in both communities noted that Arabic is their mother tongue. Concerning the language most often used by the participants, the secular participants in M.Sh reported more use of Hebrew than the religious participants did ($X^2(1, N = 108) = 5.378, p = 0.020$). No significant differences were found between the two groups in D.K. in their use of both languages ($X^2(1, N = 108) = 1.587, p = 0.208$). The participants from both communities reported that Arabic was the dominant language used there (M.Sh - $X^2(1, N=108) = 0.886, p = 0.346$, in D.K - $X^2(1, N = 108) = 0.136, p=0.713$).

However, significant differences were found between the religious and the secular participants in both communities regarding the language in which they preferred to write. The secular participants in M.Sh reported more use of Hebrew for writing than the religious ($X^2(1, N=108) = 5.378, p = 0.020$), and the secular participants in D.K showed the same results compared to the religious ($X^2(1, N =108) = 3.92, p = 0.048$). However, in a comparison of the two religious groups, the group in D.K reported more use of Hebrew on a personal level ($X^2(1, N =108) = 8.717, p=0.003$), on the community level ($X^2(1, N =108) = 4.680, p = 0.031$) and for writing ($X^2(1, N = 108) = 8.717, p = 0.003$) than the religious in M.Sh. Among the secular groups, on the other hand, no significant differences were found concerning their use of Hebrew on a personal level ($X^2(1, N =108) = 0.262, p = 0.609$). Nevertheless, the group in D.K testified that there was more use of Hebrew on the community level ($X^2(1, N =108) = 4.071, p = 0.044$) and in writing ($X^2(1, N = 108) = 8.243, p = 0.004$) than the secular group in M.Sh.

4.2.3 Language Attitudes

Before displaying the results of language attitudes exhibited by members of the two communities with different religious orientations, it is interesting to examine the language of the questionnaire participants chose. Table 3 shows significant results – overall, the participants in D.K. preferred to answer the questionnaire in Hebrew over the Arabic version, compared to participants from M.Sh ($X^2(1, N =108) = 22.72, p = 0.000$). Additionally, the secular participants in D.K. preferred to answer the Hebrew version of the questionnaire over the Arabic version, compared to the secular participants from M.Sh ($X^2(1, N = 108) = 11.725, p = 0.001$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Daliyat El-Karmil (N = 50; 46.3%)</th>
<th>Majdal Sha’ams (N = 58; 53.7%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic questionnaire</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew questionnaire</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic questionnaire</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to examine the attitudes of the two communities toward Arabic and Hebrew and to explore the differences between the religious and secular groups, a t-test was performed. The
items in the questionnaire section that tapped language attitudes were divided into several categories, and Alpha Cronbach was used to measure their reliability. The reliability of the items which constituted the Arabic measurement was $\alpha = 0.67$; the reliability of the items which constituted the Hebrew measurement was $\alpha = 0.80$.

As shown in Table 4, both the religious and secular participants from D.K. showed positive attitudes toward Arabic ($t (48) = 1.328, p = 0.191$) and Hebrew ($t (48) = 0.830, p = 0.411$), with no significant differences. In M.Sh, on the other hand, no significant differences were found between the groups concerning their positive attitude toward Arabic ($t (56) = 1.907, p = 0.062$); however, the secular participants showed a more positive attitude toward Hebrew than the religious participants ($t (56) = -4.905, p = 0.000$). When comparing the two religious groups, the group in M.Sh showed a more positive attitude toward Arabic ($t (50) = 3.176, p = 0.003$). In contrast, the D.K. group showed a more positive attitude toward Hebrew ($t (50) = -6.64, p = 0.000$). The secular groups showed similar attitudes toward Arabic ($t (54) = 1.672, p = 0.100$) and Hebrew ($t (54) = -0.78, p = 0.439$), with no significant differences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Daliyat El-Karmil (N = 50; 46.3%)</th>
<th>Majdal Sha'ams (N = 58; 53.7%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward Arabic</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward Hebrew</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To deepen our understanding of language attitudes’ results, we analyzed items related to identity, economy, and family language policy.

Concerning the identity factors – Table 5 shows that both groups in D.K consider Arabic to be an essential factor in shaping their national identity ($t(48) = 0.627, p = 0.534$). However, in M.Sh, the religious participants showed more support for the attitude that Arabic is part of their national identity than the secular participants ($t(56) = 2.142, p = 0.037$). When comparing the two religious groups with the secular groups, the former expressed significantly more support for Arabic than the latter ($t(50) = 0.2.776, p = 0.008$). In both communities, the religious groups expressed more positive attitudes toward Arabic as part of their Arabic and Druze identities than the secular participants did. However, the results were not significant.
Table 5: Means and SD of Items that Reflect Identity Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Religious (n = 25)</th>
<th>Secular (n = 25)</th>
<th>Religious (n = 33)</th>
<th>Secular (n = 25)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognizing Arabic as my national language</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>0.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic plays a strong role in my Arab identity</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>0.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic plays a strong role in my Druze identity</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>0.957</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>1.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be part of the large Hebrew-speaking community</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>1.376</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>1.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Druze community is separate from the Arab minority</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>0.913</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>1.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic is the language of Palestinians only</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>0.913</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the results were not significant, the religious and secular participants from both communities agreed that ‘Arabic is the language of Palestinians only’. Similarly, the religious and secular participants from D.K. expressed positive attitudes toward the statement that the Druze community is separate from the Arab minority in Israel. However, these results were insignificant (t (48) = -0.246, p = 0.807). In M.Sh, the secular respondents expressed a more positive attitude toward the statement than the religious group (t (56) = -2.278, p = 0.027). Additionally, when comparing the two religious groups, significant differences were reported (t (50) = -4.107, p = 0.000): the group in D.K. reported more positive attitudes toward the statement and an identical significant pattern was reported among the secular groups (t (54) = -2.288, p = 0.026).

Furthermore, the groups in D.K. reported positive attitudes toward the Druze’s aspiration to become part of the larger Hebrew-speaking community. However, no significance was reported (t (48) = 0.325, p = 0.746). In response to this item, the secular respondents from M.Sh showed a more positive attitude than the religious respondents (t (56) = -3.469, p = 0.001). This latter group expressed negative attitudes toward the statement, and their responses significantly differed from those of the religious group in D.K. (t (50) = -4.314, p = 0.000).

An item in the questionnaire tapped attitudes toward displaying the Arabic dialect while speaking Hebrew. Significant differences were found between the responses of the two groups in each community. The religious respondents from D.K. expressed a more positive attitude toward the statement than the secular respondents did (t (48) = 3.34, p = 0.002). The same significant pattern was found among the respondents from M.Sh (t (56) = 2.217, p = 0.031).

As for the economic factors, Table 6 shows that members of both communities held positive attitudes toward Hebrew for pragmatic reasons. That is, there were no significant differences between members of the two communities on this issue. In D.K., no significant differences were found between the religious and secular respondents concerning the importance of Hebrew for the achievement of better economic conditions (t (48) = -0.689, p=0.494)
or for achieving success in life (t (48) = 0.831, p = 0.410). In M.Sh, no significant differences were found between the religious and secular respondents (t (56) = -0.564, p = 0.575 and t (56) = -1.138, p = 0.260, respectively). However, although both religious groups expressed positive attitudes toward Hebrew, a significant difference was found in responses to the item that using Hebrew contributes to success in life (t (50) = -2.673, p = 0.010). No significant difference was found concerning its ability to improve one’s economic conditions (t (50) = -0.365, p = 0.717). No significant differences were found among the secular respondents in both communities.

### Table 6: Means and SD of Items that Reflect Economic Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Daliyat El-Karmil (N = 50; 46.3%)</th>
<th>Majdal Sha’ams (N = 58; 53.7%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Druze community uses Hebrew more than Arabic for economic reasons.</td>
<td>M 3.48 SD 1.159</td>
<td>M 3.24 SD 1.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a citizen in Israel, I cannot succeed without Hebrew.</td>
<td>M 4.44 SD 0.507</td>
<td>M 4.24 SD 1.091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2.4 Family Language Policy

As shown in Figure 2, both groups in D.K expressed positive attitudes toward the importance of teaching Arabic and Hebrew to their children (t (48) =1.562, p = 0.125 and t (48) = 0.932, p = 0.356, respectively). In M.Sh, on the other hand, significant differences were found between the two groups. Concerning teaching Arabic, the religious participants (M = 4.96, SD = 0.192) expressed a more positive attitude than the secular respondents (M = 4.74, SD = .514; t (56) = 2.106, p = 0.040). Concerning the teaching of Hebrew, the secular participants expressed a more positive attitude toward this stance than the religious participants did (M = 4.65, SD = 0.486 and M = 3.74, SD = 1.023, respectively; t (56) = -4.391, p = 0.000). When the two religious groups were compared to one another, significant differences were found for Hebrew (t (50) = -4.067, p = 0.000), but not for Arabic. No significant differences were found between the secular groups.

![Figure 2: Means of the Items that Reflect Family Language Policy](image)
5. Discussion and Conclusions

The findings of this study indicated that the community in D.K. practices CS more than the community in M.Sh, and that the secular groups codeswitch more than the religious groups in both communities. The second part of the study examined the groups’ language competence, practices, and attitudes, which could help explain the differences in the respondents’ CS patterns. The results showed that the secular participants from D.K. have assimilated into Israeli society. This is because some have attended Israeli colleges and universities, served or will serve in the military and are employed in Israeli workplaces. As a result, they have a clear advantage over the other three groups in terms of their competence in Hebrew. This fact could contribute to their significant practice of CS. It could also explain why these respondents chose to answer the Hebrew version of the questionnaire, not the Arabic one. In comparison, the two groups from the M.Sh community did not exhibit differences in their level of language competence.

Language attitudes were shown to affect the CS patterns adapted by each group. The secular group in D.K., who intended to join the army or were in the process of completing military service, noted that Arabic is the language that represents their national and Druze identity. However, they separated themselves from the Arab minority and declared their interest in being part of the Hebrew-speaking community. They hoped to adopt Hebrew as a mother tongue and expressed clear and positive attitudes toward Hebrew and toward teaching it to their children. This could account for their CS pattern.

The religious group in D.K., on the other hand, expressed little CS practice in comparison to the secular respondents. The religious respondents expressed positive attitudes toward Arabic, seeing it as the language that represents their identity. Based on their responses, they perceive Hebrew as the language of the State of which they would like to be part. However, their limited language competence in Hebrew may account for their limited CS pattern compared to the secular respondents.

In M.Sh, on the other hand, the secular group, who expressed the attitude that Arabic is connected to the national Druze identity, displayed more CS than the religious group despite their limited language competence. It appears as if this group seeks separation from the Arab minority and aspires to be part of the sizeable Hebrew-speaking community. Therefore, this group agreed that it was important for their children to be taught Hebrew for pragmatic reasons. They also expressed the importance of assimilating more into Israeli society to better their conditions. Therefore, their limited CS pattern might be explained not by a negative language attitude toward Hebrew but rather by the group’s limited language competence. Furthermore, their limited CS might be tied to the language policy followed in the Golan Heights, where the dominant language is Arabic.

The religious group in M.Sh. expressed an evident, positive attitude toward Arabic but not toward Hebrew. This could explain their CS pattern, which reflected rare CS and more use of Arabic on the personal level. Moreover, this group expressed the opinion that Arabic is the language that represents its national identity. Respondents from this group also emphasized the importance of intergenerational transmission of the mother tongue. This phenomenon attests to the correlation between language and identity (Schmid, 2001). It appears as if this group refuses
to accept the idea of separating the Druze community from the more considerable Arab minority in Israel. In this way, these respondents differed from the other groups that were studied in this research.

The four groups attest to the importance of knowing Hebrew for pragmatic reasons. This can help them obtain a good education and job and succeed in life. However, unlike the groups in D.K., who clearly expressed the importance of teaching these languages to their children, in M.Sh, the religious respondents showed a more positive attitude toward teaching Arabic than the secular participants, who expressed a more positive attitude toward teaching Hebrew to their children.

These findings cannot be explained without considering the socio-political context of these two Druze communities. The Druze community in D.K. exhibits loyalty to the state, which is a mandatory behavior, according to their religion (Raufman, 2011). The men serve in the army, where everything is conducted in Hebrew. In addition, because of D.K.’s location, it offers markets that attract many Jewish customers. Therefore, the religious groups, who work mainly in trade and marketing, and the secular groups, who are high-ranking officers in the army and/or have academic degrees, are more likely to be more competent in Hebrew than the religious residents in M.Sh. As a result, they will have a positive attitude toward the language.

However, in M.Sh, where inhabitants still identify as Syrians of the Golan Heights, regardless of their different religious and political inclinations, language practice and the socio-political structure of the religious and the secular groups are different. Due to the ongoing civil war in Syria and the targeting of the Druze community by Syrian revolutionaries because of its unwavering loyalty to the Syrian regime, the secular group changed its attitudes and behaviors. Now, it wishes to be assimilated into Israeli society. They wish to learn the Hebrew language, receive an education in Israeli universities, find employment in Israeli workplaces, and some even hurry to the Ministry of Interior to receive an Israeli passport. The religious group, conversely, due to their pious perspectives, still adheres to their Druze-Syrian identity. Therefore, this group seeks education and employment in the Golan Heights and does not look for these in other Israeli areas.

6. Recommendations and Limitations

The present study has two main limitations. First, the study investigated the differences between two distinct communities in order to understand the language behaviors and attitudes of members of these communities and the way these two factors connect to one another. In order to gain more information about the differences between the communities, including the behaviors and attitudes of residents who have different religious inclinations, it is recommended to study another Druze community in the Northern District, such as Julis or Sajour, and a fourth community in the Golan Heights, such as Buq’ata. It would then be possible to examine the differences between the four communities, which could lead to the generation of the Druze language structure.

Additionally, age and gender may have contributed to the results. For example, the older generations of the Golan Heights may have different language practices and attitudes than the
younger generations since the older residents witnessed the Six-Day War in 1967. Furthermore, it would be interesting to study women as well, especially religious women, who are limited in terms of educational and employment opportunities.

**Conflict of Interest Statement**
The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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