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European Journal of Economic and Financial Research ISSN: 2501-9430 ISSN-L: 2501-9430 Available on-line at: http://www.oapub.org/soc Volume 2 │ Issue 2 │ 2017 doi: 10.5281/zenodo.890373 LEVERAGING THE JOB OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE BY WORKER CO-OPERATIVES Joshua Wanjarei University of Nairobi, Kenya Abstract: This study examined the causal link between the job ownership structure and increased commitment and motivation in worker co-operatives. The separation of job ownership from management and the effective alignment of the interests of job managers and the owners have generated a lot of discussion in the past. Proponents of the agency theory have, on the one hand, recommend actions that maximize shareholders value. On the other hand, the adoption of sweeping statements of purpose by many business organizations, have led to the recommendation of the stakeholder and the stewardship theories as being the appropriate guides to corporate actions. However, given the complexities of modern business organizations where the expectations of the workers and job owners are increasingly getting blurred, reliance on these theories does not provide a satisfactory solution. Survey questionnaires were the main instrument for primary data collection in this study. Semi-structured follow-up interviews were also conducted to supplement the method. The research design included three phases of data collection and analysis. Phase one was a qualitative method of informal, semistructured interviews while phase two was a quantitative survey, the findings of which were used to construct further semi-structured follow-up interviews with worker cooperative stakeholders. The study concluded that the job ownership structure adopted by worker co-operatives has resulted into increased commitment and motivation which has in turn lead to increased productivity and improved performance. JEL: E24, J24, O15 Keywords: job ownership, ownership structure, worker co-operatives, democratic control Copyright © The Author(s). All Rights Reserved. © 2015 – 2017 Open Access Publishing Group 120 Joshua Wanjare LEVERAGING THE JOB OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE BY WORKER CO-OPERATIVES 1. Introduction It has been argued that when employees invest firm-specific human capital in the firm, their contribution is just as important as, or even more important than, the shareholders' investment of finance capital and thus recognition should be given to employee property rights in the firm equivalent to that of shareholders (Wanjiru, 2004). The concept of employee ownership signifies that workers, just like shareholders, can have a claim on the firm's resources which is protected by property rules. According to Deakin and Slinger, as quoted by Wanjiru 2004 , the employees’ proprietary interest in a firm is normally acquired when they contribute firm-specific human capital which refers to the time, skill and knowledge invested by employees in the firm. It is rationalized by the shareholder primacy norm that it is the shareholders who bear the residual risk and that shareholders’ return is realized only after the firm’s other liabilities (to workers and creditors) are satisfied, hence the firm is not bound to owe any obligations towards them (Wanjiru, 2004). This study, however, examines an alternative job ownership model in which employees can also bear the residual risk in addition to investing time and effort into acquiring the skills needed in their jobs. A standard worker co-operatives model results into business entities that are owned and controlled by their members, the people who work in them. In a worker cooperative, ownership and control of the business derive from working in the company, rather than from simply investing capital in it. A central element of the business structure is that labour should hire capital rather than that capital should hire labour (Cockerton et al., 1980). A worker co-operative model of enterprise is therefore one form of job ownership structure that prohibits non-workers from holding membership voting shares, thus retaining control of the firm within the workforce. Profits and losses from the business are allocated to worker-owners according to either the hours worked or gross pay. Skill and seniority determine wage rates, which are often set by an equitable ratio between the highest and lowest paid worker-owners (Cockerton et al., 1980; Hansen et al, 1997). The central characteristics of worker co-operatives include the fact that workers invest in and own the business and that decision-making is democratic, generally adhering to the principle of one worker-one vote. That is, workers combine their skills, experience and financial resources to achieve mutual goals. The worker co-operative model for business enterprise assures any group of individuals an effective means to combine their resources, however small. It permits a larger resource mobilization than that within the capacity of most individuals and small enterprises. As direct beneficiaries, worker co-operative members have a strong incentive for efficient operation and continuous innovation in response to changing business environments achieving thereby high rates of both initial success and long European Journal of Economic and Financial Research - Volume 2 │ Issue 2 │ 2017 121 Joshua Wanjare LEVERAGING THE JOB OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE BY WORKER CO-OPERATIVES term viability. This model favours the long term development of an enterprise compatible with the interests of the communities in which it operates. The stability it assures within local communities itself induces further entrepreneurial expansion (United Nations, 1996). For downloading the full article, please access the following link: https://oapub.org/soc/index.php/EJEFR/article/view/193 European Journal of Economic and Financial Research - Volume 2 │ Issue 2 │ 2017 122