MEDIA SYSTEM AND RE-EVALUATION OF HISTORY
IN GLASNOST-PERIOD GEORGIAN MEDIA 1989-90

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Abstract:
The aim of the article is to examine and analyze the specific Georgian peculiarities of the Glasnost policy in 1989-90, based on the relational content analysis of 158 media stories from four Georgian newspapers with different editorial policies. The term Georgian peculiarities refer to (1) media system specifics and (2) characteristic features of re-evaluation of Soviet History as a crucial part of Glasnost narrative. Studying the specific characteristics of Georgia’s mainstream media at that time is interesting in that it allows for (1) critical analysis of Hallin and Mancini’s theoretical approach and ways to enrich it through the study of media transformation from still authoritarian in form but, in essence, under a mixed type of political system (this process may be referred to as political uncertainty), and (2) accentuation of the media’s active role in shaping political and cultural memory. As for history’s reevaluation in Glasnost’s content, it still remains the main, dominant issue ultimately unrivaled (in terms of time and intensity) by any other issue proclaimed by Glasnost—be it food shortage exposed by the media or criticism of one-party rule. The issue of history’s reevaluation in the Soviet republics, in the so-called national periphery, acquired an even more critical meaning because the change brought about Perestroika there, along with the new political and social elites, placed history as the cornerstone of a future independent state, or metaphorically speaking, turned yesterday into today and further into tomorrow. This process proved to be so far-reaching that so-called inert Glasnost maintained its position even in the post-Soviet media for some time and with certain intensity. The main findings of the article are: 1) Identifying the unified and segmented paradigms of Glasnost in Georgia’s politics and media; 2) Defining the political attitudes of the Georgian political elites toward Glasnost, and 3) Distinguishing the concept of reinterpretation of history (in the Center, Moscow) from the concept of revisionism of history (National Peripheries of the USSR).

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1. For re-conceptualizing Glasnost

In global political thought - in the numerous works by American and Russian researchers of Stalinism and Perestroika (Tarasulo, I.,1989; McNair, B., 1990; Cohen, S. F., 1988; Dallin, A., 1991 and others) - every aspect of Glasnost is thoroughly described in its integrality, that is, political preconditions, the beginning, history and dynamics of development, set priorities, changes in the set priorities as the result of pressure on Gorbachev from other political powers, impossibility of Glasnost governance and setting the limit to the scope of influence, incapability of removing Stalinism from the state system that was essentially Stalinist in the first place, and so on.

In this article, we will discuss a different Glasnost, one found in a former Soviet Member Republic, Georgia. We will discuss how the Georgian political system (political elite) perceived Mikhail Gorbachev’s March 1985 message to the world: to create a unity in the Soviet life in order to purify and rejuvenate the revolutionist essence of Soviet Marxism (Leninism). More specifically, Gorbachev’s message was meant to change the meaning of “revolution” and “counter-revolution” counter to its Stalinist definition. Stalin, who blamed Lenin’s co-activists to be “counter-revolutionists” and expelled them from state governance, was himself a hurdle to the real “Leninist revolution”, therefore a counter-revolutionist.

The article will discuss whether the Georgian media accepted—if so, how exactly—the particular matter under Glasnost: reevaluation of history and, in particular, Stalin’s demystification within this reevaluation of history. To answer this questions, we have to first define what the Georgian media in the respective period embodied, its essence, and to what extend can we assume its homogeneity.

Our re-conceptualization of the Glasnost is based on the assumption that historiographic media-narrative created by Glasnost is two-dimensional. Our assumption claims that in the national peripheries of Soviet Union, which showed patterns of striving for national independence, and had previously operated as independent states (1918-1921), Glasnost had two essences: unified Glasnost and segmented Glasnost.

The nature of unification and segmentation is defined by (1) the level of dependency on the Glasnost concept (in terms of content) created in the center (Moscow), and (2) the level of dependence on the new political actors and institutions in the media. The media content of unified glasnost depends heavily on the general (Gorbachev-style) Glasnost concept, while the content of segmented Glasnost relies more on the interests of new political actors. To illustrate in detail, we offer the following operational definitions of proposed constructions:

Unified Glasnost is viewed as a particular type of pluralism referred to as a paradigm derived from the center of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party leadership. This paradigm represents the sum of said topics, a collection that turned into syntagms
by means of various editorial choices. Each media outlet, previously a part of the Communist media system, determined independently the proportion of presence of topics that were no longer tabooed due to the Glasnost policy, including “the truth about history.”

The segmented Glasnost media essence is seen, on the other hand, as the content created under the influence of political outcomes that were brought about by the social-political phenomenon of Glasnost in the political and media systems. For example, Segmented Glasnost is identified in the process of crystallization of the system of values of political spectrum, which has directly influenced media polarization in Moscow, within the central government. This feature of Glasnost has been found by a number of scholars (Murray, 1990; Oates, 2014; Holmes, 2013 and others) who indicated that fierce debates on Glasnost and Gorbachev, Marxist ideology and its' interpretation (and, consequently, the discussion on the future of the Soviet Union) led to a division in the political establishment of Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, and its’ related media, in two dramatically distinctive camps: the Retrograds and the Reformists. In the Soviet press system, it was precisely Glasnost—for the first time after the 1930s—that shed light on political parallelism.

In Georgia’s official publications, the Glasnost-inspired media content, or unified Glasnost, emerged since 1987, as for the segmented Glasnost media content made its first appearance in 1989, in editorials representing new, non-official, non-communist printing entities, emerging in the bosom of the National Liberation Movement.

Before we directly discuss our research topic, we will describe the theoretical arguments that will logically lead us to formulate our research question.

2. The National Identity and Glasnost on National Peripheries

It is recognized (Kouki, 2004; Natadze, 2002; Tarasulo, 1989; Cohen, 1988) that there were various expectations concerning the Glasnost policy in the governing central establishment and in union member countries, where there was a demand for a nation-state and previous experience of operating as an independent state before the establishment of the USSR, primarily the Baltic countries and Georgia. Different results were anticipated depending on different interests.

Lithuanian scholar Aukse Balcyteiene writes, “At the end of the twentieth century the three Baltic countries recovered their independence and for the second time in the century reappeared on the world map. On both occasions—in 1918 and 1990—the three countries came back into existence through the revival of their histories, languages, and their cultural heritage, rather than through existence of power” (Balcyteiene, 2012: 51). According to the same author, “[…] the recognition and protection of national languages, national identities, and cultural traditions have played the instrumental part in their national awakening.” (Ibid: 52)).

Like in Georgia, the leading instruments of this new wave of modernization in the three Baltic Republics were nationalism and national culture, not politics at the
national governmental level. Incidentally, these politics also feed on the nationalistic ideas.

Two years earlier, Georgian media researcher Khatuna Maisashvili (Maisashvili, 2010) pointed out that, although the top elite that allowed Glasnost to happen did not make a clear distinction between the principles of Glasnost and the Soviet-Communist press, the Glasnost period had a relatively big impact on the roles and functions of the Georgian media. For example, in spite of the fact that the awakening of national consciousness was not among the declared principles of Glasnost, the engine of political changes posed forward the national identity as one of the main media topics under the umbrella of declared principles. For example, it was impossible for the media to cover and report campaigns and propaganda of the new political forces while ignoring nationalistic topics; to write on founding a free society while ignoring ethnic and national belonging as aspects of human rights, spreading knowledge without interchanging the versions of history from official and non-official sources. This very aspect of spreading knowledge became a milestone of identity construction by the media (Maisashvili, 2010).

A large portion (but not all) of the new, albeit informal, political elite in Georgia consisted of members of the Georgian dissident movement (human rights advocates). Since 1970s, the dissident movement had been publishing Golden Fleece magazine containing, according to researchers, political materials that were eclectic in nature and quality. Along with the dissidents, the new political elite, in its fight for Georgia’s independence, was joined by those who would not take the dissident movement seriously, though they did recognize its merit. Dr. Nodar Natadze, one of the leaders of Georgia’s national liberation movement wrote in his memoir book “What I Know” (2002) that “the purpose of the national liberation movements of the colonial union republics (in the Baltic republics, Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, and to a lesser degree in Armenia, Moldova, and Belarus) in the process of the collapse of the empire lies mainly, but not exclusively, in the exposure in front of the whole world of the fact the USSR was a prison of nations, not a country or a nation as understood in the West. Consequently, this movement translated the economic and geopolitical need to dismantle the USSR into the language of human emotions and interests and moral values, in doing which demonstrating to global public opinion the necessity of this historic phenomenon and transforming it into part of global ethical agenda” (Natadze, 2002: 6).

3. The Impact of National History in the Development of Media System in Pre-Glasnost and Glasnost-Period Georgia

To define the character of the Georgian media and their interlinks with the complicated political system, we are basing on D.C. Hallin & P. Mancini’s model of classification of Media and Politics (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), discussing what type of media system could the Georgian media in 1989-1990 qualify for.

Yet before the discussion, we should mention that Glasnost in Georgia (and Glasnost in general) is divided into several parts (according to some scholars, actual
Glasnost included two parts with some sub-timeframes, while others group Glasnost into three phases, although these timeframes in Georgia and elsewhere are not identical. We prefer to take into consideration two substantial timeframes of Glasnost. Despite particular divisions in general, researchers define two time spans as follows: Part one encompasses a period from 1985 to spring of 1988, and part two from spring of 1988 until September 1991. We believe it possible to identify another sub-part known as the inertia Glasnost, which refers to the preservation of Glasnost-like approaches and topics, whereas neither Soviet Union nor President Gorbachev existed anymore, and independent countries were building other types of political systems. The media, however, followed Glasnost inertia and tried to achieve its ‘independence’ by treading the paved way.

In Georgia, we see different timeframes. Part one, as shown by the integrality of the Georgian media’s essence, stretches from 1986 until April 9, 1989, and part two from April 9, 1989 to the first multi-party elections in October 28, 1990.

Glasnost and Georgian Glasnost have different causes for respective timeframe division. Part two of Glasnost, known for its fierce anti-Stalinist discourse, started when Gorbachev realized that reforms were simply a failure, therefore, in order to save Glasnost politics, pressured by the Red Intelligentsia, he started to revision history by means of the media. In Georgia, on April 9, the violent crackdown of peaceful protest by the Soviet Army turned into an overnight revolution. Mourning was quickly replaced by victory (that cost innocent blood), and these circumstances set the ground for different, winning political system’s media.

Historically, Georgia has always showed characteristics of the South European media. It emerged in elite circles, being meant for the elite, more of a political tool than business, more analytical opinion content-orientated than news-oriented (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). After years of Georgia’s independence (1918-1921) there came a period the domination of political publication, and the Georgian media assumed signs of corporate democracy and political pluralism (Shamilishvili, M. & Tsereteli, M., 2016). However, Sovietization placed the Georgian media under the communist (party) pressure for 70 years. So what patterns did the Georgian media utilize in1986 -1990?

Distribution and consumption level of press. High numbers of publications, massive distribution and a high rate of reading were the characteristics of the Soviet media. Magazines were an indicator of active political, cultural, and social life. The relative freedom brought about in media content, re-discovery of the past, ‘yesterday-turned-into-the-news-of-today’, substantially increased the demand on printed press.

3.1 Political parallelism
At first, the media was in total parallel position with the state and bureaucracy. In this case, political parallelism came to effects not only with the party, but also bureaucracy and nomenklatura. In other words, party parallelism was equal to parallelism with legal-rational state. Since 1989, political forces emerging in the midst of the National-Liberation Movement became active, new coalitions appeared to establish their own
print publications and actively try to penetrate the mainstream media as a new political elite. Here we encounter another kind of specific attribute of parallelism. The Georgian media was simultaneously under pressure from Soviet nomenklatura and the National-Liberation Movement emerging from underground or from the streets.

3.2 Professionalization

The authors of publications that created the content of Glasnost were representatives of scientific-cultural elite. In other words, they were representatives of Intelligentsia. Journals voluntarily yielded “author’s positions” to visiting authors, which may have had a couple of reasons: 1) Editors (core figures in creating Glasnost narrative) assumed that Intelligentsia would do a better job in controlling the political agenda of Glasnost; 2) Journalists could not overcome the fear of censure, or their own incompetence of setting the agenda.

Among the media researchers, Maya Gogoladze and Lia Toklikishvili (2008) were the first to study the patterns of media published after the April 9, 1989. Their findings present a very valuable theory for in-depth studying of the media in this period. According to them, new, Glasnost-born political or party publications:

(1) External parallelism was dominant, as each new publication was in parallel with some new political force or organization. Consequently, these publications rejected internal pluralism, equal representation of different political positions.

(2) Pluralism existed in an organized form, similar to polarized democracies.

(3) The massive influx of Intelligentsia representatives as authors in the media space, which represents another specific ‘breed’ of media instrumentalization.

(4) The media text did not represent a structured concept, as it was typical for Glasnost, serving instead as a facilitator of crystallization process of political elites.

First and fourth patterns clearly testify that new publications were essentially different from the official media softened by Glasnost.

In the second period of Glasnost, in order to differentiate the nature and source of power, two terms were used: Communist State (formal) and non-formal state. The latter encompassed social-political coalitions and their leaders, without whom the formal state could not make a decisions. Unlike the Center in Moscow, Glasnost in Tbilisi did not break off the unity inside the formal power. The alternative political center emerged in informal political circles, not within the state. Alternative voices were heard in the publications of informal powers massively published after the April 9, 1989.

To clarify the subject of study, and to justify the selected study population, we must briefly portray the situation in which these two ruling classes existing in parallel found themselves, with their interests defining the specifics of the media system and the media content of different publications with different affiliations. These classes were the party nomenclature and the elite of the national liberation movement. Many researchers characterize 1998-1991 as a period of dual power in Georgia. Given the
political importance of those years, and the development dynamic of political groups, these classes absolutely cannot be viewed as static unions with fixed, unchangeable interests and values, goals and policies for action. At the initial stage (1986-1987) the elite of the national liberation movement attempted to position itself as an actor in the political arena, while laying claim to the country’s informal governance at the second stage (1987-until April 9, 1989, after which they were referred to as non-formals), and not only enjoying actual power but also looking to come to power, that is, targeting formal and institutionalized governance, at the third stage (from April 9, 1989 until the first multiparty elections on October 28, 1990). As for the party nomenclature, it degraded, even though its representatives tried to survive as a particular type of political class at the expense of transformational mimicry. Nodar Natadze defines the motivation of this group, “The motive was the aspiration of partycracy to legalize what it had stolen, to turn hereditary their social station, and to turn into an open plutocracy” (Natadze, 2002; 6). Natadze believes that, by 1989, the greed and slothfulness of the Communist nomenclature and bureaucracy had clearly surpassed their aggressiveness and long-evaporated political fanaticism (ibid.).

The practical implementation of dual power, which took place in fact, would have been impossible had these two political groups been clearly separated. In this context, two important circumstances must be pointed out: (1) Both classes had supporters from among intelligentsia who were the accessed voices in both the formal Communist media and the informal media of the national liberation movement, and (2) representatives of scientific and cultural intelligentsia formed new political unions of their own—for example, Rustaveli Society or the National Front within the national liberation movement—whose media publications were, in essence, formal media publications with broad pluralistic contents. These circumstances help understand that our sources selected from the study population were characterized by similar numbers of authors and, to some extent, had similar topics.

Given the conventional, not only Soviet, views on the media, the media in Georgia at that time, as well as in Russia, was perceived as an inseparable part of power and, as S. Oates points out, “[...] see themselves as media subjects, without the rights, or either media citizens or mediaconsumers” (Oates, 2006: 192). It is very important in this context to recall Dr. Elena Vartanova’s Soviet take on journalistic professionalism: “Soviet media theory defined journalism as ‘a social activity of collection, transmission and periodical dissemination of information through mass communication channels aimed at propaganda and agitation’” (Ovsepyan, 1979:7). Soviet journalism had a clear normative character; professional norms included the priority of accuracy over topicality and timeliness, the supremacy of feature and polemic genres involving personal judgement and opinions, and the role of “publicists” (political or moral essays with moral reasoning) linking journalism to ideology (Vartanova, 2012: 136). Instead of the autonomous group of journalists, these conventionally accepted characteristics applied to all authors, primarily those emerging from the bosom of new elites. In light of the
foregoing, it seems paradoxical that static, pseudo-pluralistic, dynamic, and organizationally pluralistic systems alike operated in line with same norms.

4. Research question and methodology

Since we accept the direct influence of elites on media, and we know the origin and interests of new and old elites, we can set forth the research topic in the following manner.

Research question: What were the similarities and differences between the traditional party-published press and the publications of new political coalitions in terms of reevaluation of history?

4.1 Research population

Four publications. Two of them, (Komunisti and Zarya Vostoka), represent official publications of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party in Georgian and Russian. As for the two other publications (weeklies Sakartvelo [“Georgia”] and Mamuli [“Homeland”]), they were the publications of the new political structures Popular Front of Georgia and the Rustaveli Society, published exclusively in the Georgian language.

We propose two timeframes, one covering a period from January 1st, 1986 until April 9th, 1989, in which we examined and analyzed only official publications, and the second time frame covers a period from April 9th, 1989 until October 28th, 1990 when the first multiparty elections were held. Notably, Mamuli and Sakartvelo started in 1989, and our research question and hypothesis are primarily connected to the political and cultural changes of that period.

The amount of empirical data includes 158 units in total: Komunisti (65 units), Zarya Vostoka (41 units), Mamuli (27), and Sakartvelo (25).

The method incorporated two methods: (1) the morphological and structural analysis of selected units to identify similar elements of narrative, and (2) content analysis. As for unit of analysis, we selected each story, each reference to Glasnost in story, reinterpreting historical facts, events, or persons differently from Stalinist discourse.

The morphological and structural analysis sought to identify common grounds shared by stories of our interest printed by both formal/partisan media and informal media. This analysis revealed the following common elements:

Two timeframes and two spaces in each story, with one timeframe being ongoing, present, and the other one or another historical period. One context, namely Glasnost, as an articulated notion in the text. The positioning of Glasnost as a mandatory precondition that made it possible to “notice” and narrate the story of concrete facts that had taken place in the past, and the other context is an environment portrayed by one or another historically decisive period or event.
Coding under the second analytical approach, that is, content analysis, was carried out based on these two, nearly parallel, time and space paradigms, and for the overall database:

1. **Attribution: Valence of Mentions (references) of Perestroika and Glasnost**
   Under this attribution, code 1 was assigned to samples mentioning Glasnost positively/with gratitude, while code 2 was assigned to samples mentioning Glasnost negatively/as detrimental and futile.

2. **Attribution: Target Historical Period**
   Under this attribution, code 1 was assigned to samples covering Georgia’s pre-Soviet period. Code 2 was assigned to samples covering the history of Georgia’s Sovietization. Code 3 to samples reflecting Soviet repressions against Georgian nationalists in the 1920s. Code 4 for to samples related to the Stalinist repressions in the 1930s. Code 5 to those covering the history of WWII. Code 6 to those covering post-Stalin politics in the 1950s, and code 7 to those featuring the dissident movement in the 1970s-1980s.

3. **Attribution: Advisability of Interpreting History**
   Under this attribution, code 1 was assigned to those analyzed samples that covered legal or moral reparations to the victims of repressions (code name: Restoring Justice). Code 2 was assigned to those uncovering previously unknown, “hidden” persons, facts, and events (code name: Uncovering the Truth). Code 3 to those featuring the unknown national narrative of Georgia (not the Soviet Union).

4. **Attribution: The Hero of the Altered Historical Narrative**
   Coding was conducted according to concrete persons or political groups mentioned in texts.

5. **Attribution: The Antihero/Villain of Altered Historical Narrative**
   Coding was conducted according to concrete persons or political groups mentioned in texts.

6. **Attribution: Time Aspect of an Event Covered**
   Under this attribution, code 1 was assigned to analysis samples passing off the past as the present, as today’s breaking news, as an actualization of Glasnost in the life of that time. Code 2 to those passing off the past as the future, a prefiguration of an independent Georgia tomorrow.

7. **Attribution: Guilt: Crime and Punishment**
   Under this attribution, code 1 was assigned to analysis samples presenting the victim as “guilty without guilt”. Code 2 to those portraying the main character not as a clueless victim but one only physically overpowered by the Soviet regime.

Coding was carried out by two people (coders) who agreed on 141 samples of 158, yielding a 0.89 coefficient of reliability according to Holsti’s formula.
5. Findings and Elaboration

Content analysis revealed in all seven attributions—that is, general characteristics—value-based, ideological, and political differences between formal- and non-formal-content media, that is, between unified Glasnost and segmented Glasnost (see illustration 1).

It is characteristic of Glasnost-period publications to assess the terms Perestroika and Glasnost as necessary narrative components. Almost without exception, the term Glasnost itself is found as a declared attitude of the author in the most significant sections of publications, such as the lead and conclusion. The frequency with which Glasnost is mentioned leads one to suggest that it is but an example of phatic language and formality, yet juxtaposing these two media types reveals that the valence of Glasnost mentions is one of the differences between them, clearly defining the positive/negative paradigm.

For example:

- **Official media:** “Perestroika and Glasnost are the words of the party”, “Perestroika is a calling, and Glasnost is the responsibility of us all”, “Perestroika and Glasnost are not directed against the Soviet system. They should not distract the Soviet people and lead them to lose watchfulness”, “It is only through Glasnost that telling the truth has been made possible. The truth is always beneficial, though not always pleasant”, “Glasnost has shattered the crooked mirrors”, and others.

- **Media of National-Liberation Movement:** “Glasnost is a component of freedom, but it is not freedom itself”, “Glasnost enforces ephemeral state on the public, creating an illusion of freedom”, “Perestroika and Glasnost are Gorbachev’s way of buying time”, “Aging Leninist socialism and the Soviet authorities are dying out naturally. Nothing and nobody can save them”, “Gorbachev’s Perestroika is just as ephemeral as Khrushchev’s communism and Brezhnev’s developed socialism.”

The difference between the targeted historical periods quantitatively dominating the two media types also clearly demonstrates value-based and political differences between them. Targeting a historical period is logically linked to the attribution of feasibility of altering history. Their point of intersection lies where media choose a space as their comfort zone.

For the official media, such comfort zone is the entire Soviet Union, and the repressions of the 1930s are equally all-Soviet, from the Carpathians to Central Asia. Media of National-Liberation Movement, on the other hand, chooses the history of Georgia’s Sovietization as its playground, with its broad historical context covering both pre- and post-Sovietization periods, including the repressions in the 1920s. The biggest changes are found in this very timeframe, the whole paradigm turns upside-down, celebrations are replaced by mourning, heroes with antiheroes, truth with lies, people’s will with the whim of a handful of conspirators, and so on. Even before the
official collapse of the Soviet Union, spatial change took place in the media of National-Liberation Movement, with the space shrinking from one republic within the Soviet Union to a potentially independent state with all characteristics to succeed as a nation: specific language, territory with experience of functioning as a state and not associated with one particular ethnicity, territory separated by borders from other nations, also high group loyalty and solidarity, shared history and unique culture. This is exactly why the official media offers Restoring Historical Justice, legal and moral reparations for the victims of repressions, as an excuse for rewriting history, while the informal media for writing history.

As for history’s new heroes and antiheroes, given the central government’s view as the starting point, the paradigm of the altered historiographic narrative must have been created by Stalin and those repressed by him. In Georgia, however, the situation was somewhat paradoxical. While the party’s official publications published legal texts to rehabilitate Bukharin and other party figures repressed by Stalin, and media text on repressed Intelligentsia formed as separate media narrative, open criticism of Stalin was sparse. Stalinism, not as much Stalin himself, was somewhat actively criticized, though Stalin and Stalinism were not always identified as the same. This paradox emerged in statistics as well. The number of samples rediscovering Stalin was 47, while the number of those describing repressed Intelligentsia, repressed party nomenclature, or the achievements of the first and second waves of the dissident movement, was 91. Equally paradoxically, the mainstream media, even on phase two of Glasnost, fail to portray representatives of the third wave of the dissident movement as heroes, which may be due to two circumstances: 1) Gamsakhurdiaii and other dissidents are informal leaders, contemporaries of Glasnost, while Glasnost never decreed to reevaluate those still living, and 2) Even with more or less freedom of speech, they remain not overly popular, the way they were in the 1970s. Even in the period of Glasnost, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and other dissident leaders were presented in the media as ones with questionable reputation and questionable values. To represent Gamsakhurdia, his past, his TV confession, is pushed forward, not his vision of the future for Georgia’s independence.

The Media of the national liberation movement portray a more logical picture, with a better arranged paradigm. The informal media do not question the sameness of Lenin and Stalin. This approach radically defies the main dimension allowed by the center, one of Anti-Stalinist discourse. To the media of non-formals, Stalin is Lenin’s offspring, one and the same with Lenin, with Georgia’s continuous national liberation movement as the new hero. One of the characteristics of this sub-frame is that it is composite and can be divided into micro-discourses: The heroes of the national liberation movement and their martyrdom, the fight for national liberation, one not only for ideas but a matter of life and death, the national liberation movement: prospects of making a political principal a reality.

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ii The First President of Georgia, 1990-1992, Leader of National-Liberation Movement in 80s and 90s.
While drawing media portraits of repressed party nomenclature or Intelligentsia, Georgia’s mainstream media followed one material pattern, that of the tragedy of those guilty without guilt, the tragedy of talented patriots who fell victim to the “evil regime.” Unlike the mainstream media, which offers no ideological assessment, but only the biographic profile of those “unfairly forgotten”, in the media of the non-formals, every “new” or “newly discovered” name and life is portrayed in a drastically polarized couple: a human being and a freedom-choking regime, a person with national ideals and a regime that kills everything national.

The newly emerging heroes of non-formals media were not portrayed as victims of absurdity. On the contrary, they were active people who chose to be anti-Soviet, who were aware of the consequences of their work and their fight against the Communist system. Informal leaders and their press seemed to be trying to catch up with the past, to correct their past mistakes in the present, not by way of reparations for the victims, as we see in the mainstream media, but through laying the foundation for tomorrow’s independent state, a state already aware of its enemies and future allies, aware of its holidays of joy and days of mourning, aware of its heroes and condemning those unfaithful to its ideals.

6. Conclusion

Two types of political elites influenced Georgia’s media system in 1989-1990s. Under the influence of these elites, twofold Glasnost content was created: pro- and anti-Glasnost, that of nomenclature in the official media, and of the national liberation movement’s leaders in the media of newly emerging political unions. The boundaries of this influence over the media, however, were not delineated as clearly as in the case of superficial, formalized review. The leaders of the national liberation movement would not settle for influencing the media content created by the publications under their control. They would penetrate nomenclature-controlled outlets as well. This, among others, may have been due to the fetal state of the liberal-democratic Intelligentsia in Georgia (a very small group of Intelligentsia, referred to as Perestroika Foremen in Russia, which had never been dissident by definition, though it did sympathize with the dissidents—however honestly or insincerely, which is hard to tell—and played a certain buffer role in the relations between old and new elites). It was unable to serve as “an independent voice” in the media. Georgian nomenclature, on the other hand, which was responsible for Glasnost content in mainstream publications, was so badly alienated socially and psychologically from the people, or actual problems, so insecure about its power on the ground that it never developed into a n individual player in the process of Perestroika (unlike in Russia). This very circumstance—that neither the old (Communist) elite nor the weak liberal-democratic elements could counter nationalism (in terms of intensity, relevance, and ability to attract public sympathies) with a suitable ideological platform—turned nationalist forces into uncontested media content leaders.
This very nationalism, not different types of social conflicts, served as the foundation of emerging political parties. Consequently, the media which sprang up at that time:

Unlike the official media, it did not share the anti-Stalinist discourse of Glasnost. Moreover, it broke the internal dimensions of Glasnost.

Unlike in the official media, history was reinterpreted through negating Marxist ideology only and through introducing nationalist discourse, not by way of accents dictated by Perestroika.

This is exactly why the changing historiographic narrative stood for history reinterpreted in the mainstream media and history revised in the media of non-formals.

References


**Newspapers**

*Komunisti*, 1986-1990;
*Mamuli*, 1989-1990
*Sakartvelo*, 1989-1990
*Zarya Vostoka*, 1986-1990;

**Appendix**

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<td><strong>Official Media</strong></td>
<td>Commending Glasnost 81%</td>
<td>1930s repressions 73%</td>
<td>Restoring Justice 65%</td>
<td>A repressed representative of scientific/cultural elite 80%</td>
<td>Stalinism, Stalin’s inner circle, Stalin 85%</td>
<td>Past as Present 85%</td>
<td>Guilty without Guilt 76%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Media of Non-Formals</strong></td>
<td>Negative evaluation of Glasnost 80%</td>
<td>History of Georgia’s Sovietization Repressions in the 1920s 92%</td>
<td>Writing National History 92 %</td>
<td>A fighter for Georgia’s independence 95%</td>
<td>Lenin, Soviet regime, Stalin 95%</td>
<td>Past as Future 98%</td>
<td>Defeated hero 95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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