



THE MILITARY ART OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM IN THE RESISTANCE WAR AGAINST THE US IMPERIALISTS FOR NATIONAL SALVATION (1954 - 1975)

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Abstract:

The Communist Party of Vietnam's military art in the resistance war against the U.S imperialists for national salvation is the continuation of Vietnam's tradition of fighting the US to save the country. Over thousands of years of fighting to protect the Fatherland and liberate the nation, Vietnam has built an advanced and unique military art and ideology. Vietnam is a small country, often having to fight against an aggressive move with larger and stronger manpower. Therefore, how should Vietnam's military art and thought develop in order to win the victory? A small country defeating a large country is a bitter contradiction and must face many difficulties and hardships. Solving this contradiction is a great creation, which requires very high intelligence and the art of excellence in war leadership. That is the uniqueness, the development, the characteristic of Vietnamese military thought and art.

Keywords: Marxism-Leninism; Ho Chi Minh's Thought; military art; the resistance war against the U.S.

1. People's War Art, All People's National Defense, Revolutionary and offensive art

Military art in the resistance war against the U.S imperialists is unique because it is a people's war. To have such a war, the essence of that struggle must be just - gaining independence and freedom for the people, liberating them from the oppression and exploitation of the U.S imperialists - Diem empire. That struggle is non-stop, always taking the offensive as the main thought, attacking the US in a comprehensive way. In order to resolve the contradictions about the correlation and comparison of the US forces, maneuverability, firepower, equipment and technical weapons, goals to be achieved and actual capabilities... it is necessary to conduct the people's war on the solid foundation of the people's war posture and the all-people national defense. Our resistance line and motto are all-people, long-term resistance, and self-reliance. We cannot start the

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resistance war with a big fight or there is only one form of regular combat, but we have to move from guerrilla war to regular war and especially a skilful combination of these two forms of the people's war.

During the resistance war against the U.S imperialists, the people of the North and the South, although living under two regimes, were both people of the same country, the separation was only temporary. The liberation of the South and the reunification of the country is not only the task of the people of the South. On the contrary, the people of the North, as a socialist stronghold and a great rear, made a decisive contribution to the achievement of national independence and reunification of the country. There was a time when the U.S imperialists escalated the war to the North, and now the rear has become the front line. The only difference is the way the war is waged. In that particular historical situation, if military art did not contain the above ideas and views, it would be difficult to win.

Our forefathers once summed it up: the whole people were united, the whole country contributed efforts, and the people's strength was to be deeply rooted. It is the top policy to protect the country. The above ideas and views are the practical basis for the desire to come true. Only the position of the people's war can be stretched, dispersed, and divided into pieces, so that the US is outnumbered, strong but weak, mobile but passive, and unable to gather strength and power to the place they want. Military art is also unique in that it closely combines traditional and modern elements. The whole people fought against the US, and the whole country fought against the US, women, men, old people, and young people all could participate. As President Ho Chi Minh said right from the resistance war against the French: *“Any man, woman, old person, young person, regardless of religion, party or ethnicity must stand up to fight the French to save the country as long as they are Vietnamese. Those who have guns use guns. Those who have swords use swords. Those who don't have swords use picks, spades, and clubs. Everyone has to work hard to fight against the French colonialists and save the country”*. All of those elements can be considered a traditional combination of guerrilla war and the regular war on a strategic scale, campaign art and combat. Going from guerrilla war to regular war, in the end, fighting with combined combatants, using low modernity to win over high modernity, using art to win over technology, and using synergy to win over local power.

2. The art of defeating the US by means of a combination of intelligence and the art of fighting

Due to the conflict in the number of troops, weapons equipment, and military techniques, the way of fighting in military art bears the impression of many enemies, small ones fighting big ones. The great success of military art is to reverse the battle, change the balance of forces, create favorable opportunities, and combine military, political, and diplomatic attacks... to end the war victoriously at a favorable time.

To do so, it is necessary to have “long-term resistance” to have time to transform weak into strong, less into more, and find appropriate forms of combat. The war must be

prolonged, the resistance must be arduous, and it must go from small to large, from primitive to modern, from weak to strong. But the basic art of combat is still in favor of fighting with cunning, not using force against force, hard and hard, but combining wisdom and force, hard and soft. Achieving that is knowing how to trick the US into our strategies and positions. Only when knowing the rules of the US's combat operations, knowing the US's strengths and weaknesses, can we deceive them. From there, we gain the initiative to control the opponent and put them in a passive position.

All three campaigns started the resistance war against the U.S, including Binh Gia campaign (from December 2, 1964 to March 7, 1965), Dong Xoai campaign (from May 10 to July 22, 1965) and Ba Gia - Northern Quang Ngai campaign (from May 29 to July 20, 1965) were all victorious. One of the basic reasons is due to the practice of correct campaign tactics: attacking and ambushing, fighting the US outside the fortification is the main thing. That way of fighting is not new because it was applied quite thoroughly in the resistance war against the French, but fighting the US has many other points. American troops have high mobility and more solid defensive bases. Attacking and ambushing during the liberation war is a strategic policy, the art of campaign and the right way of combat, is the basic element in the art of gradually transforming the relationship of fighting forces. It is a part of the art of small winning big in concentrated armed forces, weak against strong in modern technical weapons and logistics. The process of campaign implementation is the process of applying previous arts such as ambushes... and creating new forms of combined offensive movements.

At the end of 1965 and early 1966, there was a big difference in the number of concentrated troops, modern technical equipment, as well as potential in the military economy between Vietnam and the U.S. Especially, this was the time when Vietnam really fought against the U.S. This was also the first time Vietnam encountered the U.S army at the scale of modern military contracts conducted by the US. Plei Me campaign (Central Highlands) from October 19 to November 26, 1965, Bau Bang - Dau Tieng campaign (South East) from November 1 to November 27, 1965, Tay Son Tinh campaign (Quang Ngai) from February 20 to April 20, 1966, Dac To campaign (Northern Central Highlands) from November 3 to November 23, 1967... consecutively and interwoven to answer the question: Can Vietnam defeat the U.S? In the two dry seasons of 1965 - 1966 and 1966 - 1967, Vietnam defeated the U.S army not only in the type of offensive campaign but also in the counter-attack campaign.

Plei Me Campaign (Central Highlands) from October 19 to November 26, 1965, was the first campaign of the main squadron of the Central Highlands front, the campaign to directly fight American troops on the southern battlefield in their "Local War" strategy. The campaign took place in a space of about 1600 km² (from Bau Can - Plei Me to Duc Co - Ia Drang). Vietnam carried out sieges and reinforcements: fighting the puppets, then destroying the U.S; pulling American troops out of their bases, and going deep into the rugged mountainous areas to destroy the US. With the way of fighting "attacking and ambushing", Vietnam chose Plei Me as the siege point to lure the

American troops to come. In this battle, Vietnam destroyed most of the first American battalion.

On Bau Bang - Dau Tieng campaign (Southeast region) from November 1, 1965, Vietnam implemented a plan to attack in Dau Tieng branch to pull the reinforcements out to destroy the US. This campaign is the first offensive campaign of the armed forces of the Southeast region, first of all, against the US combat troops that are considered the most elite of the US infantry divisions while they are in a very aggressive "search and destroy" position. It is remarkable that the art of gathering forces to fight key battles, especially the very daring ambush on the US's formation in Bau Bang. Tactical fighting is also very creative and flexible: large-scale raids on US troops temporarily stop garrison and ambush - mobilize to attack moving US troops.

The unique feature of the art of fighting the US is knowing how to use good tricks and schemes to pull American troops to the battlefield Vietnam has chosen, putting them deep into a dangerous position and breaking their position. Besides, the art is also the flexible management of the transformation, forcing them to accept fighting in places that are unfavorable to them. Vietnam has built a position where Vietnam can fight the US in front of and behind the US, organize a decisive battle zone, lure the US into it, and create the situation and opportunity to destroy them. Vietnam often focused on fighting American troops outside the fortifications, far from the base, so Vietnam can perform the art of *"luring the tiger away from the mountain"*. That art is also the art of directing the US to Vietnam's schemes, forcing them to fight in areas they didn't want so Vietnam could benefit but they were at a disadvantage. Many American military scientists have had to admit that they were passive about how to fight.

The 1972 strategic offensive created a new situation on the battlefield. Subsequent campaigns such as Quang Tri campaign in 1972, the Northern Central Highlands campaign in 1972, and Loc Ninh - Binh Long campaign in 1972 all highlighted the initiative in attacking, and actively controlling the US's position in strategic operations and campaigns. Vietnam could forecast strategic situations, campaigns, on that basis choose the direction of the campaign opening with key battles that hit the target right from the start. The art of deceiving the US, and sending American troops to the Khe Sanh battlefield was also excellent. There Vietnam had the advantage of terrain and maneuver to concentrate the forces over the US at the decisive moment of the campaign. Besieged and heavily destroyed by Vietnamese troops, finally, the formidable units of the US army including marines and cavalry had to flee from Khe Sanh to avoid another "Dien Bien Phu" as the President of the United States feared.

In the North Central Highlands campaign in 1972, the US was also deceived and tricked by Vietnam which the US was attracted to Kon Tum so that Vietnam could organize a battle at Dak To - Tan Canh first. Because of deceiving the US, the battle in Dak To - Tan Canh took place quite smoothly and achieved quite thorough results. In handling campaign situations, Vietnam's intentions and combat plans were expected in advance with the actual situation of the war on the battlefield quite well. That was a way

to use it quite skillfully in both strategy and campaign. It was considered a dangerous piece of martial arts that took a long time, with quite sophisticated and ever-changing art. The general offensive in the Spring of 1975, with the breakthrough battle of Buon Ma Thuot, showed that the art of strategic intelligence between Vietnam and the US was highly developed, making the US not realize that the opening campaign would be the Centre of Vietnam or Central Highlands, so they could not predict the possibility that Vietnam chose Buon Ma Thuot as the first breakthrough. It was a process of the Politburo, the Central Military Commission, the war leaders and cadres and soldiers of Vietnam. The success of the 1975 Central Highlands Spring campaign and the subsequent campaigns in the General Offensive and Insurrection proved Vietnam's art of war direction, and military art, especially the art of campaign and war. The art of "development to a high level", which created strategic positions, campaigns and created battles, opportunities, and concentrating forces - strength was more decisive than the US in the direction and area Vietnam has chosen to destroy the US. Hitting a fatal weakness that shakes the entire US's strategic defense system, overturning the US's strategic position, was a very elaborately formed way of fighting, distilled from many experiences of the resistance war, many campaigns and many battles.

The strategic way of fighting in the military art of the resistance war against the US and saving the country is to use the people's war to intersperse with the US, forcing the US to disperse, divide, and respond passively everywhere. On that basis, Vietnam actively lured the US and sent the US where they wanted. The contradictions between dispersion and concentration, occupation and mobility were inherent contradictions that cannot be resolved by the invaders. Deepening that contradiction can only be done by conducting guerrilla wars that developed widely in the people's war, must develop both regular and guerrilla fighting styles, fight with three types of troops, with the combined strength of the army. Compared with the resistance war against the French, the resistance war against the US had a shorter period of fighting and guerrilla fighting. The stage of regular fighting at a low level appeared earlier, because Vietnam had a regular army and combat experience. In fact, during the war of resistance against the US, many new types of operations appeared on the campaign scale (counter-offensive, offensive, and defensive campaigns). The counter-offensive campaign to defeat the Junction City campaign (February 22, 1967 - April 15, 1967) defeated the largest operation in the course of half a million American troops fighting in the South of Vietnam, in order to find and destroy the headquarters of the resistance and the 9th division of the main force of the region. In this counterattack campaign, in terms of forces comparing the two sides, the number of Vietnam's main forces was not equal to one-third of the US's force, inferior to artillery, and Vietnam did not have armor and air force. In order to counterattack against such a large-scale operation, Vietnam cleverly organized the army, people, and government agencies. The Party of Vietnam became units of guerrilla, self-defense, and local troops to fight the US on the spot and widely, creating a people's war in an area with almost no people to disperse the US. Vietnam skillfully used the main battle force in the outer circle to create powerful punches gathered on the flanks and behind,

destroying and causing damage to the American army groups. The people's war created by Vietnam in an unpopulated area was a great surprise to the US. That is the unique feature of our art of organizing and using Vietnam's counter-attack forces.

In 1971, the victory of the counter-offensive campaign defeated the "Lam Son 719" operation of the Saigon puppet troops on the battlefield of Route 9 - Southern Laos, marking the high development of the campaign art in the resistance war against the US. This campaign took place between two relatively powerful main blocs - both well-equipped or relatively modern taking place in a very politically sensitive battlefield area, both close to their respective rear. Vietnam's forces - including the mobile main block and the local forces, were already deployed. This was the campaign that started the period when Vietnam's army launched large-scale concentrated combat campaigns. This was not a continuation of a defensive campaign, but only combined with tactical defense (blocking points), was the art of establishing our position, breaking the US's position, and combining rhythmically and effectively between two forces: master mobile force with local forces in mountainous areas. With a good method of fighting, besieging and breaking each US wing to actively end the campaign promptly. Those first two counterattacks were unique. It defeated America's strategy of destruction, making America's hope of victory far away.

After these campaigns, Vietnam forced the US into a position of defensive, not daring to attack outside the line, moving into strategic defense, especially the US withdrawal of both ground troops and air force. After 1972, and especially in 1973 and 1974, Vietnam was in the active position of attacking and continuing to expand the liberated and defensive areas in the Thach Han River. These were very basic conditions for Vietnam to organize the practice of General Offensive and Uprising in 1975 on a tactical scale (hit points to destroy reinforcements, fight enemies in fortified fortifications, fight enemies in motion, etc.). It is noteworthy that it was always combined with the revolting masses to gain mastery to varying degrees. The regular way of fighting with the main force was key, but it must be supported by the local squad for the regular attacks to be effective.

During the resistance war against the US, the object of the campaign was very complicated. In addition to the US army, puppet troops, and vassal troops, they received a great deal of direct support from the US air force and navy. On the other hand, due to the development of weapons equipped with military-technical means, the form of combat and the way of fighting the campaign were also very flexible. In any phase of the war, Vietnam still had to combine closely between guerrilla warfare and regular war, but the final blow must still use the main force as the decisive punch. Vietnam's common strategy must be based on guerrilla warfare to win.

On the basis of clearly defining the object and specifying the nature of the war, the Party of Vietnam and President Ho Chi Minh promptly directed the army to change its fighting style to suit the target audience and to adapt to the characteristics of the battlefield, population, geography, and socio-political conditions. The reorganization of combat units at the strategic, campaign, and combat levels effectively against the strategic

layout of the American and puppet troops was carried out promptly. On a strategic scale, the guiding ideology of President Ho Chi Minh and the Party of Vietnam's fighting style was to fight back step by step, overthrow each part, and advance to overthrow the entire US army. This idea was thoroughly grasped during the war. Vietnam in turn defeated the three major war strategies of the United States: the strategy of special war, the strategy of local war, and the strategy of Vietnamization. Each time the strategy is changed, the US is weaker and weaker every time. Because the latter strategy was more effortful than the former, but both were born in a passive position, so these strategies faced many contradictions that cannot be easily resolved.

The general offensive and uprising of Spring 1968 left Vietnam with very profound strategic lessons on both successful and unsuccessful aspects. It was remarkable that, through this event, the Party Central Committee and President Ho Chi Minh as well as the whole Party, the people, and the whole army saw the possibility that the US - puppet was a reality, but the principle must be maintained: do not be impatient. It was necessary to find a more appropriate way to fight, especially to meet objective and subjective conditions for strategic victory. President Ho Chi Minh wrote: *"In the early spring of this year, the South Vietnamese army and people heroically attacked the US continuously, consistently, evenly, fighting very well, winning very big. The American US has lost badly, but they have not given up their ambition to invade, and have not yet withdrawn their troops from our country. Therefore, we must continue to hit hard until the Americans get out and the puppets are completely defeated, until the South is completely liberated."*

With the offensive and uprising in the Spring of 1968, Vietnam has not completely defeated the will of the US to invade, so they were still in Vietnam. If you want to chase the US, you have to hit hard. President Ho Chi Minh's profound strategic thought was put into combat practice. The formation of many mobile main corps, the division of the battlefield, the rational organization and use of armed forces on the basis of studying the strategic arrangement of the US's strategic forces at both ends and the gap between them. Vietnam chose the Central Highlands as the main battlefield to open the Spring 1975 General Offensive which was the result of applying the guiding ideology of the Party Central Committee and President Ho Chi Minh.

Entering the Spring 1975 General Offensive and Uprising, with the intellectual efforts of the whole nation, Vietnam designed a strategic battle, arranged a reasonable scientific plan and created an important opportunity.

Vietnam's plan was to stretch the US at both ends of the front line, creating a weakness between the gaps. The northern front line included Hue and Da Nang in which Vietnam and the US concentrated a large force. The front line of the South was Saigon - the capital of the US. Here, both sides also concentrated their relatively large troops. It is worth noting that with the ingenious art of deploying troops, Vietnam put an army of soldiers at the armpit of Saigon about 50-60 km. Doing that is like putting a gun to the back of the opponent's neck. Until now, many military and military historians still find it difficult to explain the strange and interesting strategy above. Because in military principles, it is unacceptable for the US to create the above situation.

Creating a strategic position of “double burden”. Accordingly, the middle of the Central region must have loopholes in the North and South of Vietnam. In this region, the US only had the forces of the 2nd military zone, the 2nd corps was very thin and weak. After establishing a powerful battle position, Vietnam advocated organizing the first strategic blow to break the US's midline. Attacking this place was dangerous in both depth and breadth, causing the US's strategic battle to break quickly, creating an extremely dangerous strategic position. The US could not rescue each other because they were pinned at the North and South ends. Therefore, in the second consecutive strategic blow, the US no longer had time and forces to organize an effective response.

The breakthrough of the opening campaign in the Central Highlands is very important because that's the “hard start”. Winning or losing this battle had a huge psychological impact on both sides of the war. Before the battle in Buon Ma Thuot, there were still two different opinions. The first idea was that Pleicu should be attacked because this was the military headquarters with the forward headquarters of the 2nd military zone and the 2nd army of the Saigon puppet army. If Vietnam attacked there and won, then unlike other places, the US will disintegrate. That was true, but compared to Buon Ma Thuot, Pleicu was a stronger base so it was difficult to defeat the US easily because the US's forces were concentrated here quite a lot. It was especially difficult to form a dangerous shape from the east because the US deployed a thick force from Pleicu to Kom Tum. In contrast, Buon Ma Thuot was a military base in the city, which was much weaker than Pleicu. The US's forces concentrated here were only one infantry regiment, an artillery regiment, an armored tank regiment, and several security battalions. This was only the base of the 23rd puppet division, but it was an important political, cultural and economic center of the Central Highlands. From here, it was possible to develop an attack to poke down the coastal plain of Nha Trang to cut down the central coast to threaten North Saigon more strongly. From this central plateau, it was also convenient to hit the north of Saigon. Vietnam could surround 4 sides and organize dangerous attacks with bold and unexpected attacks. Therefore, deploying forces was easier because of the favorable terrain. In addition, in early 1974, after the liberation of Ya Sup, the door to the north of Buon Ma Thuot was considered to be open. Buon Ma Thuot has done a good thing: using half the effort and getting twice the work.

In the book “Report of a Soldier”, General Otmolen, commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Force in Vietnam wrote: “*The collapse in South Vietnam began when General Phu gave orders without explaining that the only option is to immediately withdraw from the provinces of Kom Tum and Plei Cu*”. The great victory in Buon Ma Thuot and the Central Highlands needs elaboration in the preparation process of Vietnam's army and people under the ingenious and scientific leadership of the Party. With specific tactical operations and clever secrets, Vietnam has successfully implemented the art of diversion at both strategic and combat levels. This confirms that a profound issue of Vietnamese military art is the art of fighting.

The unique feature of military art is not only the specific fighting style but also the guiding thought through strategic thinking, including judgment and prediction,

planning goals and limits for each specific historical period for each campaign and battle. To fight back step by step, to overthrow each part, to move forward to completely overthrow the US is a deeply pervasive thought in military art. The goal of the revolution and the resistance war of Vietnam was to defeat the US. That goal was based on scientific thinking about comparing forces between Vietnam and the US. Reaching that goal was to hit the US's vital point, a good and good art. If the goal was higher or lower, it also meant hitting the wrong one, hitting the target and paying the price for poor art.

On the basis of the actual military victory that Vietnam forecasted the possibility of a successful end to the war, there were many possible bases that were earlier than initially expected. After the first few campaigns, Vietnam went from forgetting to fight the US to the ability to defeat the US and then continuously defeating the US in many overlapping campaigns at the end of the war. That is, Vietnam has creatively applied the traditional fighting method, thoroughly taking advantage of the natural terrain factor to limit the mobility and firepower of the US, especially the layout of the battle to put the US in a plan. The war strategy is to launch an all-out, all-people war. Using guerrilla warfare to drain the US's life force, making the US gradually become weaker, to develop it into a regular war, and then combine it with guerrilla warfare with regular warfare to strike annihilation blows. Applying the law of war to the anti-American resistance war can form the principle: by conducting a guerrilla war for the entire people, the US cannot be defeated, but only by guerrilla warfare, it is difficult to defeat the US. These two types of warfare must be combined to achieve victory. The resistance war against the US also did not escape that rule and that also explained that while fighting with such a modern army, military art is still brilliantly formed and developed by the fighting style of the three armies with the close combination of three factors force, time, and potential. The terrain, weather, climate, people, justice, political and spiritual factors are still focused on and thoroughly exploited.

3. Art of diversion

After the Spring 1968 offensive and uprising, the US Department of Defense also admitted: *"By studying the methods and predictable habits of the US, Vietnam's plans for diversion and strategic dispersion are shallower and more subjective"* and *"Vietnam's strategy shows unity and cohesion"*. Diversion is very useful in the context of the relationship in favor of the US, because it can contribute positively to the transformation of weak into strong, and at the same time limit and reduce the US's strength. Diversion is also a content of the scheme to deceive the US. It can lead to an effect: Use half the power (which) doubles the work. It is *"deceiving the US by actions or by camouflage in order to make the US misjudge our intentions, attack direction, forces and other actions, concealing the true content of the plan, control the US according to our will, make them reveal their forces and create surprises in combat"*.

Thanks to the appreciation of the art of diversion in both strategy, campaign and combat, many victories in the resistance war against the US became a reality. It takes

many matches and specific campaigns to reach the level of “art”. During the resistance war against the US, after a series of battles with the US from 1964 to 1967, Vietnam initially gained experience in fighting the US. It’s not easy to trick them. In the battle of Dac To in 1967, Vietnam succeeded in using diversionary defense posts to “pull” the US to the planned battle areas so that large units could stand in other places to mobilize to destroy them. It can be seen that the diversionary action in this battle is quite methodical and it is worth mentioning that through this battle, Vietnam created a new form of tactic: the combined offensive maneuver.

The Spring 1968 offensive and uprising is a typical example of perfection, having a decisive impact on winning the surprise of the general offensive and uprising. Thus, creating a large force, creating maximum power - even surpassing the US in important directions and areas in each war depends on many factors. Effectively engaging in that mission is the art of diversion. The resistance war against the US can be seen in Buon Ma Thuot in the Central Highlands campaign, and the resistance against the French can be seen in the 1953 - 1954 Winter-Spring War with the Dien Bien Phu campaign as rich lessons because the combination is very good. Ingenious ways of fighting traditional and modern through strategic diversion and campaign. Only then will Vietnam know how dangerous the diversionary is because if it succeeds, it creates a surprise, the initiative in the operation that everyone knows: winning by surprise and taking the initiative is to keep the lifeline of the operation.

4. The art of anticipating situations, selecting situations, leading situations, and confronting situations

It is also the art of directing and operating the war. Regardless of the operational scale, most situations are expected to occur, they will be proactive in responding. Once you have analyzed the options, predicted the main and secondary situations, and how likely they are to happen, especially if you find a way to eliminate the worst situations, you will definitely find the most optimal solution to gain victory and the possibility of winning is more realistic.

In 1967, on the basis of three possible scenarios, the Central Resolution of Vietnam was born in January 1968. Although the Spring 1968 offensive and uprising had certain limitations in terms of objectives and methods of action, its initial victory had great strategic significance - gradually withdrawing its involvement on the ground of American troops in South Vietnam. After all, how effective military technology, equipment and weapons in war are not only created by humans but used by humans. On the one hand, the way to defeat Vietnam is to minimize its damage and technical effects by many measures from simple to low modern. Many simple methods were combined to create effective complexity of engineering to counter highly effective American technology. For example, how to fight guerrillas, and how to fight special forces also limit the effect of the US’s high technological warfare. Because Vietnam had forces everywhere, Vietnam could make war everywhere, that is, the ability to maneuver was

everywhere. Mobility with an important element of forces solved by people's war with three types of troops is truly a unique "tactical solution". To some extent, that solution explains the perception that low modernity can defeat high modernity in specific war situations, when an appropriate countermeasure is found.

Taking advantage of modern warfare means - airlift helicopters, US troops almost landed anywhere they could, regardless of terrain and weather. Thus, their mobility is great and superior but has been limited, if Vietnam correctly predicted the US's landing point, then with the position Vietnam has laid out, the US army has just set foot on the mainland and was beaten. On the other hand, if the organization attacked on a large scale, the ability to transport US troops couldn't be fast and many forces were available in the place. Therefore, these solutions were all passive measures. That was also the point where Vietnam's military art hit the American army.

One of the highest ladders that the US imperialists had made was the strategic air and naval raid to the North of Vietnam in 1972. This was a very fierce confrontation in terms of technology, talent and will. This glue defeat affects the course of the war. At that time, the US used modern military technology, which was a B52 flying fortress with very powerful destructive firepower. The naval blockade by sea included many modern warships and torpedoes. This could be considered as the highest escalation in technology, intensity, scale and brutality in the US war. In that situation, it is not possible to compare hard versus hard, modern versus modern, but must combine hard and soft, primitive and modern in art, and bring into full play the technical capabilities of Vietnam's weapons. Vietnam's anti-B52 and sea blockade techniques proved to be effective because Vietnam mastered the US's operational rules. Moreover, while using anti-aircraft missiles, as well as another anti-aircraft firepower, Vietnam was constantly changing the form of tactics and always invented new techniques. "Dien Bien Phu in the air" and "People's war at sea" is a combination of many ways of fighting in a campaign, many types of weapons, techniques, and war according to a single combat plan, and many forces in a particular determination and purpose. No modern sophisticated technology can be so perfect that there are no drawbacks or limitations. It's just that the more advanced the technology, the harder and less difficult it is to detect its limitations.

In war, it is necessary to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the artistic element in the use of force and the use of technical weapons. It proves the ability of the Vietnamese people to master war weapons during the war. The more difficult the situation, the more clearly intelligence, creativity, ingenuity, and wisdom were revealed. Not only spirit and energy but also wisdom, and scientific and technical knowledge were applied in this modern war. Not only hardware but also software was mobilized.

Not only once, but the US twice ravaged the North of Vietnam with air and navy. On August 5, 1964, the US used a modern air force to attack the northern coastal areas of Vietnam and used the navy to threaten to encircle the northern coastal areas of our country. In the first battle, Vietnam's army and people defeated the US with lower technical equipment but with a very heroic fighting spirit. Lessons from the first game

were always valuable for the next matches. The experience of fighting the US in the early 70s was a prerequisite for victory in the early 1980s.

General Gorgiada, deputy chief of staff in charge of planning and operations of the US Air Force, admitted: *“North Vietnam has developed the most experienced air defense force in the world. They were clearly more experienced than any other force in launching surface-to-air missiles to bring down planes. They also had extensive experience in ground-based active interception. They had developed a seasoned air defense force that was as effective as any other country’s air defense system.”*

5. Conclusion

More than 30 years have passed, since the end of the resistance war against the US for national salvation, Vietnam has made great strides on the path of independence, reunification and building a prosperous country, firmly defending the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. From the ruins of the devastating war, Vietnam has built a country with great achievements, increasingly asserting its role in the international arena.

The current international and domestic context has changed a lot, the situation is developing very complicatedly and quickly. The world’s scientific and technological revolution has brought about great progress in socio-economic life, giving people a much higher quality of life than before. The trend of peace, cooperation and friendship among countries is becoming the trend of the times. However, hostile forces still plot against socialism, overthrow the socialist state, and cause local wars, and armed conflicts in many places. This further requires Vietnam’s military art to be raised to meet the requirements of firmly defending the country.

Vietnam’s military art today cannot be separated from the traditional military art with the rules that have been moved in the war and verified by the war of national liberation. In the current cause of defending the country. Military art contains a very important task of participating in repelling the risk of war, maintaining peace and political stability, and developing the economy.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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