THE STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES OF BEST PRACTICE IN SIERRA LEONE: CASE STUDY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

Abu Kai Kamara

Abstract


The Corporate Governance practice has been in existence but became topical and the focus of research interest with the collapse of organizations such as Enron, Parmalat, Tyco, WorldCom, Barings, Volkswagen, and Lehman Brothers. The collapse of these organizations brought waves of panic to shareholders, stakeholders, and governments, which resulted in the establishment of well-developed corporate codes of governance in Europe and the United States of America (USA), but this has not been the case in most of the emerging economies, and Sierra Leone is not an exemption. This research focused on the search for codes of best practice in corporate governance in Sierra Leone, and the aim is to contribute to the suggestions of specific codes of best practice based on good practices adopted in developed economies that have successfully implemented Corporate Governance Codes. This research reviewed available records and related literature for data collection and search for good practices of corporate governance. The findings suggest that Corporate Governance is still in its embryonic stage in Sierra Leone, and the effectiveness of the newly formed National Corporate Affairs in spearheading and providing guidance for the implementation of corporate governance is yet to be tried and tested in the short-term, medium-term, and long-term. Therefore, future research is recommended to assess the performance of National Corporate Affairs in spearheading and providing guidance on the implementation of Corporate Governance in Sierra Leone. Other future research is also recommended. Effective corporate governance is critical to the long-term success of any company, and it is essential for companies and governments to continually evaluate and improve governance practices in companies to ensure that they are aligned with evolving best practices and stakeholder expectations. Hence, corporate governance reforms have become a global issue over the last few decades. Countries around the world have been amending their legal systems and stock exchange listing requirements to reform corporate governance and develop new codes of best practices.

 

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Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) in Sierra Leone, Corporate Governance, Board Members, National Public Procurement Authority (NPPA), Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC)

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.46827/ejhrms.v5i3.1751

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